


THE CASE FOR ELECTORAL REFORM



THE CASE FOR ELECTORAL REFORM

With an Examination of the
Principal Objections

by

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With a Foreword by

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Foreword

DEMOCRACY in the strict sense of the word, that is, government by the people, is impossible. Obviously a great community of forty million citizens cannot actually handle the machinery of government. It is well to recognize this, because it is probably partly a sense of unreality that has lately weakened the hold of democratic principles upon public opinion, and so paved the way to increased authority by bureaucracy, or in other countries to actual dictatorship. It is well, therefore, to say that while democracy is impossible, Representative Government is possible, and may really perform important functions. It is true that great executive decisions which sometimes outweigh everything else in importance must be taken by an oligarchy. For example, the decision to go to war in 1914, and the decision to go off the gold standard in 1931 were taken by a small number of individuals, even the House of Commons having only a nominal control over the decision. But over legislation a representative chamber like the House of Commons has a real control; and indirectly it has influence over the executive which requires its support and is solicitous of its approbation. Ministers, moreover, though not formally chosen by the representative body, yet obtain the choice of the Crown advised by the Prime Minister largely by the degree of approval that they enjoy from the House of Commons.

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Representative Government is therefore not an unreality. It is possible that these real powers may be exercised by a body chosen by the people which shall in the balance of its opinion reflect the general judgment of the people. To be sure, the people do not themselves decide anything except the choice of their representatives. The doctrine of what is called a Mandate is imperfectly thought out and vaguely expressed. What the people choose at an election is the party and the leader in whom they will put confidence and the candidates who are members of that party. In some cases a great issue notoriously dominates the election, but this is unusual. No doubt the electors choose men because they support certain measures, but nevertheless it is men that they choose rather than measures that they approve. The doctrine of Burke expresses an ideal which is not fully realized; but it cannot be dismissed as an unreality. He taught that representatives are chosen as typical men who, though selected by a particular constituency, nevertheless expressed the mind of the whole Commons of the Realm. The representative body, therefore, should be the mirror of the electorate deciding as the electorate would wish, though they are themselves unable to formulate that wish.

But by the operation of the party system and by the confidence and enthusiasm naturally excited by leading politicians, the General Election tends to become not merely the choice of representatives but a plebiscite in favour of a particular leader or leaders. As things are, this is unavoidable, but it is well to recognize that

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it is dangerous. For plebiscite is the harbinger of dictatorship; and there is great danger that the authority of the leader of the party, or of the three or four leading members of that party, may become dictatorial. Something of the kind did actually happen during the war, when what was called the War Cabinet exercised an absolute and unquestionable authority over the whole administration and over Parliament as well. The only safeguard against plebiscite leading to dictatorship is the moral authority and consequent power of the representative body. Full democracy cannot be realized; but representative government is an effective safeguard against dictatorship. If the House of Commons is really felt to be the mirror of the opinion of the people, it will be able to exercise both over legislation and over the choice of ministers such a control as will make dictatorship impossible.

But unhappily, as is shown in the following pages, the House of Commons as now elected is far from being an accurate representation of the electorate. In one way or another, but usually by way of exaggerating the effect of the majority vote, the House of Commons is far from representing with precision the balance of opinion among the electors. The consequence is that, though its only title to respect is that it is representative, in point of fact its representation is so distorted as to be unreal. This is very dangerous, because though the ordinary man does not think out in express language the defects of our representative system, he has the general sense that there is much unreality about our present form of government, and is the more ready to

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be attracted by the specious claim of strong government for efficiency. Not that I am apprehensive of a single personal dictatorship in this country. That is too deeply unacceptable to our traditions and mental habits; but a perpetual "War Cabinet," a small body of Ministers of the Crown exercising authority nominally through Parliament but in fact absolutely, does not seem equally impossible. People hunger nowadays for efficiency, and they have got accustomed to the idea that a general election chooses the rulers as by a plebiscite. Yet to prefer the plebiscitary form of government to the representative is already to have gone a long way towards dictatorship.

People must make up their minds whether they really want representative government or not. The taste for bureaucratic vigour and the constantly increasing sphere of administration make for the dictatorial, rather than the representative, system. Yet if we are drifting in that direction, it is unconsciously. Nothing excites more repulsion than imagining an English Hitler or Mussolini. But if we are to escape dictatorship and save representative government, we must make it representative; for that is the only title it has on our regard. Everyone must feel that the House of Commons does really reflect the general mind and opinion of the people; and that there is the same balance within it that there is outside. This would practically do at least two great things: it would give a sense of stability, because it would be known that though there might be changes at the General Election, there could not be such a landslide as would cause a

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complete transformation. The oscillation from party to party which we call swing of the pendulum would be much slighter; and as years went on a sense of secured stability would grow up. Secondly, the fact that majorities in Parliament are small majorities inevitably gives to the more moderate members of the governing party greater weight. Now, there is always danger that a great majority, chosen by an electoral landslide, may fall into the hands of extremists and insist upon changes which are in truth not the least desired by the majority of the electorate. Moderate opinion among the representatives tends to be overborne. The prestige of the electoral victory so much exaggerated and distorted by our present electoral machinery intoxicates the victorious party, and moderate counsels are swept aside. All this comes from the representation being imperfect. The true general sense of the community is moderate; and whether it inclines in the one direction or the other, it does so in a temperate degree. But nevertheless, as Mr. Daniels shows, there may be an immense disproportion between the number of representatives chosen from, and the number of votes given to, the victorious party.

These considerations, as well as many more which Mr. Daniels sets forth, point to the adopting of proportional representation. Experience, where it has been tried, shows that whatever difficulties there are in applying it, it does really make the proportionate opinion in the representative body the same as that expressed in the votes that are given. If we want true representation, then this is the way to get it; but we

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must make up our minds that we do want it, and dismiss all dangerous flirtation with the notion of strong government chosen by a plebiscite; for that will develop into the dictatorship, if not of a person, yet of a Committee.

HUGH CECIL

Prefatory Note

I OWE a deep debt of gratitude to Mr. A. J. Gray, Joint Secretary of The Proportional Representation Society, who has undertaken the task of going through my manuscript and checking the statistics, and has made many valuable suggestions. He has also seen the work through the press.

At the same time, the responsibility for everything that appears in the text is mine and mine alone.

S. R. D.

This was so arranged before the death of the Author. The Author died at a very short interval after completing the revision of the Manuscript.—A. J. G.

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The Fate of Nations

IF there are any people in this country who hanker after dictatorships, this book is not for them. I write in the full conviction that representative government, whatever its drawbacks, is the only form of government which guarantees to its subjects those rights of freedom of thought, freedom of speech, and freedom of worship which are essential to their well-being.

Where democracy prevails, the fate of the nation depends on the result of national elections, and the result of an election depends, to an extent which few people realize, on the system of voting in force. A general election determines the character, and to a large extent the personnel, of the government which will rule the country till the next dissolution of parliament, and in Great Britain the normal life of a parliament is five years. In theory this should ensure that the country is governed in accordance with the desires of the majority of its citizens, for it is, if not the first, at least the second principle of democracy that the majority shall rule. The first principle I take to be that every adult citizen shall have some share, however small, in choosing the government to which he will owe obedience. In practice a vicious system of election may hand over the control of parliament, and with it the nation's destinies, to the representatives of a

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minority; and government by a minority is, as Philip Snowden once observed, indistinguishable in principle from a tyranny.

This not only may happen, but has repeatedly happened both in this country and abroad. At the general election of 1886 a small majority of voters were in favour of Mr. Gladstone and of Home Rule for Ireland. Owing to the system of election in force, this majority so signally failed to secure the preponderance of the representation that the members opposed to Home Rule formed a majority of 118.* The consequence was to postpone the settlement of the Irish question for thirty years, with results which we are still experiencing and may continue to experience for generations to come. These unhappy results flow directly from a system of election which rendered the desires of the majority of no effect, and by a strange irony it was Mr. Gladstone's *Redistribution of Seats Act* of 1885 which, by dividing the country into single-member areas, contributed to bring them about. The Conservative majority of 1924 was likewise an unreal majority; the Conservatives polled only 48 per cent of the total vote. Twice in the history of the United States a President has been elected by a minority of the votes cast; in 1876, when President Hayes received 250,000 less votes than his opponent Tilden; and in 1888, when Harrison

* An analysis made by Mr. J. Rooke Corbett, Fellow of the Manchester Statistical Society, of the total voting strengths for and against Gladstone, including an estimate for the uncontested divisions, was accepted by the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems, 1910, as "representing the truth as nearly as circumstances would permit." Under this estimate there was a pro-Gladstone majority in the country of some 54,000 votes.

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became President with 100,000 less votes than were cast for Grover Cleveland.

In South Africa the general election of 1929 placed General Hertzog in power against the wishes of the electorate, which wanted General Smuts. General Smuts' party, the South African party, secured a considerable number of uncontested seats and had in addition a majority of 20,000 over General Hertzog's Nationalist party. The people of South Africa voted in vain. It was the representative of the minority who emerged triumphant from the election. It was the minority representative who became the ruler of the nation.

To put a minority in power is not the only wrong that can be done to democracy by a perverse electoral system. It may work the other way, and so completely deprive a minority of its just share of representation as to render it impotent. This is not good for the nation. When Augustine Birrell, adapting Shakespeare, coined the epigram: "Minorities must suffer; it is the badge of all their tribe," he was not giving utterance to a profound truth. The remark was as superficial as it was smart. Minorities also have their rights. The recognition of this is one of the great differences between democracy and dictatorship. In a country like Italy the minority lies prostrate, helpless. It can only submit to what is imposed upon it. In a democracy nearly all legislation is modified in its passage through parliament by discussion in which the minority plays an important part. But where the minority is reduced to a mere handful, the government of the day is under a strong

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temptation to disregard it. An opposition of fifty will in the nature of things be regarded more lightly, not to say contemptuously, than one of two hundred, and an opposition of twenty than one of one hundred and twenty. Indeed, a government with an exaggerated majority is often tempted to enforce its will in disregard of the misgivings of many of its own followers. It has only to make the question one of confidence to ensure that they will not carry their discontent into the division lobby.

More serious still is the danger that a parliament elected on the crest of a wave of mass emotion may compel the adoption of policies injurious to the national interest which the nation in its more sober mind would not have endorsed. All large communities are liable to these paroxysms of mass emotion. A wave of anger or fear or misapplied patriotism sweeps through the community, and affects everyone to a greater or less degree. The wisest heads are least affected, and retain their balance and their sanity. Unfortunately it is just the most fickle and least instructed elements in the electorate which, by changing sides in a crisis, can change the representation of anything up to half the constituencies. Under proportional representation a change in opinion produces a change in representation proportionate to its extent and no more. The victims of mass hysteria can get their own representatives, but they cannot deny representation to the more sober and far-seeing.

The outstanding example of this is the parliament elected in Great Britain at the conclusion of the Great

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War, as the result of what is known as the "coupon" election. Mr. Lloyd George was then Prime Minister at the head of a coalition government, with Mr. Asquith and a large section of the Liberal party in opposition. The Ministry wished to continue in office during the period of reconstruction. In order to ensure success in the general election, Mr. Lloyd George and his Liberal colleagues entered into an agreement with the Conservative organization, deciding what candidates, whether Conservative or Liberal, should be authorized to contest the various constituencies (candidates so approved were said to have received the "coupon"), and pledging both parties to the alliance to use their whole strength to secure the return of these candidates, even against candidates of their own political party. The result was a House of Commons in which 5,101,000 supporters of the coalition were able to secure 472 seats, while 4,674,000 opponents had no more than 130 all told. Of these, twenty-six were Conservative members whose supporters, nearly 400,000 in number, had refused to accept the decision of the coalition allotting the seat to a Liberal, so that the real opposition, consisting of the Liberal and Labour parties, with one or two independents, was reduced to 104! Irish representation was determined on different considerations and need not be taken into account. The figures include uncontested seats, of which there were eighty-two, sixty-nine for the government and thirteen for the opposition. It may be assumed that in these there was the same disproportion between representation and voting strength as in the case of the

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contested seats. Under P.R. it is unlikely that any seats would have been uncontested.

As the coalition victory had been won on a policy of exacting the uttermost farthing from a beaten enemy, the result was that when Mr. Lloyd George, brought into touch with realities at Versailles, tried to moderate the excessive demands of the French, he was frustrated by the very parliament his own tactics had brought into being. There were certain proposals he dared not make, or if made dared not support, lest he should be repudiated by the House of Commons on which his power depended. With a parliament in which all sections of national opinion had been fairly represented he need have had no fear. That was the tragedy. Mr. Lloyd George himself paid for his mistake in full. By his action he broke up the party to which he himself belonged. From the date when the coalition came to an end he never again held ministerial office. But that did not undo the harm which had been done.

2

A Perversion of Democracy

TO support a plea for reform, it is necessary to show that our present method of voting is unsatisfactory. This, however, has been for many years so obvious that no one but a wilfully blind man could fail to be aware of it. The system does not even guarantee the rule of the majority, as the instances given in the previous chapter show. There is, in fact, hardly any conceivable perversion of democracy which the single-member system has not brought about, even in the comparatively short period since the Great War. In 1924 it gave to a minority party complete control of the House of Commons. In the constituencies, in contested seats, they were in a minority of 850,000, and of the uncontested seats they secured just half. In the House of Commons they had a majority of 215. The 1929 election gave the largest representation to the second largest party, and the second largest representation to the largest party. The Conservatives polled a quarter of a million votes more than Labour and obtained twenty-eight fewer seats!

In every election except that of 1923 there has been the grossest inequality in the value of the vote to different classes of voters. In 1924 the Liberals secured only one member for every 80,000 votes cast, while the Conservatives got a member for every 20,000 votes,

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and Labour one for every 38,000. In 1929 the proportion between Liberal members and Liberal votes was one to 90,000. In 1931 the number of Labour votes cast per member elected reached the huge total of 144,000. In 1935 the opposition parties obtained only half the representation per head obtained by electors supporting the government.

The gross disparity in the value of the vote, bad as it is, is far from being the whole story. The single-member system operates as a decree of disfranchisement to large sections of the electorate. The futility of the vote to an elector who is in a perpetual minority has been pointed out, with his usual directness and felicity of phrase, by Lord Hugh Cecil. He said :

“Consider the position of the person who is a convinced member of the Labour party and lives in Hertfordshire. He is always in a minority. He has the fun of going to the poll and making a mark on a paper every three or four years. That is all he has. It would be just the same if I lived in the county of Glamorgan, in one of the mining districts. I should have no electoral power whatever.”

There are many areas, particularly in the southern counties, where a Liberal or Labour voter has as much chance of helping to elect a member of parliament as he has of electing the Pope. On the other hand, few enterprises can be more hopeless than the task of a Conservative candidate in Merthyr Tydfil or in the Gorbals division of Glasgow. Conservatives in those areas are political outcasts. They have as little share

A Perversion of Democracy

in choosing a government as the inhabitants of Mars. As Lord Hugh Cecil pointed out, their rights are confined to making a cross on a voting paper every four years or so. The position of Liberal and Labour voters over a large part of the South of England is similar. The following table gives the figures for contested seats in the eleven southern counties of England at the 1935 election:

<i>Party</i>	<i>Votes</i>	<i>Seats</i>
Government	2,068,292	77
Labour	836,582	0
Liberal	320,297	2

Such a state of affairs breeds a feeling of hopelessness, and is responsible for much of the apathy one so often sees denounced in the newspapers. When a man knows that nothing he can do will make any difference, he has no incentive to exert himself, and the infection is liable to spread to the members of a party which is in an overwhelming majority. They say to themselves: "Our candidate is in no danger of being defeated. Why should we trouble to go to the poll in the rain?" The remedy for apathy is to do away with its causes, to make the election interesting, to give the elector some value for his vote, even if he does not happen to belong to the dominant party in that particular area. I have had personal experience of the resentment which this exclusion from real voting power arouses. Time and again when I have been speaking on the subject people have come up to me and told me that they have voted conscientiously at every election since they were entitled to vote, and yet have never had any result from their

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vote. I remember one man in particular who added bitterly: "I shall never vote again until the system is changed."

The last great count against the single-member method is that it is wildly uncertain in its operation. No one can tell in advance whether it will produce a reasonably representative parliament or a grotesquely unrepresentative one. The scales may be weighted in either direction. It is even possible that they may give true weight! In general, the largest party gets excessive representation, but not always; in 1929 the second largest party scored at the expense of the largest, and both at the expense of the smallest. Observers both of the right and of the left have borne testimony to this uncertainty. In 1935 Mr. J. S. Middleton, the Secretary of the Labour party, said: "There is no greater gamble on earth than a British general election." A few years earlier, Mr. J. L. Garvin of the *Observer* warned his Conservative friends that the most requisite of all reforms was a reform of the electoral system which would prevent disastrous legislation being carried by a government representing only a minority of the people. "It is a strange thing and a perilous," he added, "that a Conservative Ministry, because it expects to profit once more by the luck of the polls, should maintain one of the most discreditable electoral systems in the world, and stake upon a gambler's chance the control of the House of Commons, the future of national finance, and the fortunes of the Constitution."

3

The Reason Why

IT is natural to ask why a voting system which professes to be democratic, and which does give the seat to the candidate with the largest vote, produces these strange results; why it allows the smaller of two parties to secure more seats than the larger; why it results in 5,000,000 Liberals in a total vote of 22,000,000 obtaining less than 60 seats in a House of 615. Why is it that a party which commands the support of two-fifths of the electorate in a county with five electoral divisions may, without any alteration in its total poll, either win all five seats or fail to secure any representation at all or get any result in between these two extremes?

That any of these results is possible may easily be seen by trial. Suppose the total vote to be 1,000—the actual figures would of course be a hundred times greater, but small numbers are easier to deal with—and one party, the Yellows, to have 400 of these, 80 in each division. The remaining 600 voters may consist of 350 Blues with an average of 70 votes in each division, and 250 Reds with an average vote of 50 per division, so that the Yellows may outnumber each of their opponents in every division and win all five seats. On the other hand, the Blues may number 450 with an average vote of 90 in each division, and the Reds only 150. In that case every seat may be won by the Blues.

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Again, the Blues and the Yellows may be exactly equal with 400 supporters each, while the Reds have only 200, but 100 of the Red voters may live in one particular division which they win, while the Blue vote in that division numbers no more than twenty. In that case, if the Yellow vote is evenly distributed over all five constituencies the Reds will win one seat and the Blues four, and, again, the Yellows will have no representation. These examples are set out in tabular form below:

EXAMPLE I

PARTY POLLING 40 PER CENT OF THE VOTES WINS EVERY SEAT

<i>Party</i>	<i>Constituencies</i>					<i>Totals</i>	
	<i>N.</i>	<i>E.</i>	<i>Mid.</i>	<i>S.</i>	<i>W.</i>	<i>Votes</i>	<i>Seats</i>
Yellow	80	80	80	80	80	400	5
Blue	70	70	70	70	70	350	0
Red	50	50	50	50	50	250	0

EXAMPLE II

PARTY POLLING 40 PER CENT OF THE VOTES LOSES EVERY SEAT

<i>Party</i>	<i>Constituencies</i>					<i>Totals</i>	
	<i>N.</i>	<i>E.</i>	<i>Mid.</i>	<i>S.</i>	<i>W.</i>	<i>Votes</i>	<i>Seats</i>
Yellow	80	80	80	80	80	400	0
Blue	90	90	90	90	90	450	5
Red	30	30	30	30	30	150	0

EXAMPLE III

OF TWO EQUAL PARTIES, ONE GETS NO REPRESENTATION AND
THE OTHER FOUR SEATS OUT OF FIVE

<i>Party</i>	<i>Constituencies</i>					<i>Totals</i>	
	<i>N.</i>	<i>E.</i>	<i>Mid.</i>	<i>S.</i>	<i>W.</i>	<i>Votes</i>	<i>Seats</i>
Yellow	80	80	80	80	80	400	0
Blue	95	95	95	95	20	400	4
Red	25	25	25	25	100	200	1

The Reason Why

The answer most commonly given is that these anomalies are due to the existence of three parties. A system, it is said, which worked admirably when there were only two parties, breaks down when there are more than two. This answer is incomplete, and therefore misleading. It is perfectly true that, the existence of three parties increases the evil. Only with three or more parties could you have such a result as occurred at Huddersfield in 1929, when 41,000 votes out of 67,000 were cast for unsuccessful candidates and the successful candidate represented only 38 per cent of the votes polled.

As soon, however, as we lift our eyes from the single constituency and take figures for a county or a larger area, it becomes at once apparent that it is not the presence of three parties but the division of the country into single-member areas which is the real cause of the trouble. Results just as absurd may occur with two parties as with three. In the county of Devonshire in 1924 the Labour vote outside Plymouth and Devonport was insignificant. In only two of the seven county divisions did the Labour party put up a candidate. In both cases that candidate was at the bottom of the poll and lost his deposit. In neither case was his vote large enough to have any influence on the result. The fight was between Conservatives and Liberals, and the two parties were so evenly balanced that out of every nineteen votes cast the Conservatives secured just over ten and the Liberals just under nine. Yet the election resulted in a solid block of seven Conservative members. In every division they just outnumbered the Liberals.

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Eighty-eight thousand Liberal voters got nothing by their votes, while an excess of 19,000 votes out of 195,000 was sufficient to secure seven seats. All over the South of England the same thing was happening. From every county a solid mass of Conservative M.P.s took train or car to Westminster. In the eleven counties south of the Thames and Severn, the representation consisted of 84 Conservatives and one Liberal. Yet the votes polled were:

Conservative	1,456,702
Liberal	445,636
Labour	483,873

In 1935 things were no better, though in this case the opposition parties were less evenly balanced (*see* page 23). In 1929 the representation of Cornwall changed from being exclusively Conservative to being exclusively Liberal, yet the turnover of votes was only about 7,000 in an electorate of nearly a quarter of a million.

The surprising thing is not that representation should often be unfair, but that it should ever be fair. If supporters of the different parties were evenly distributed throughout the country, then even with no third party in existence a party with 55 per cent of the votes could secure every seat in the House of Commons. It is only the accidental variations in distribution, Conservatives being more numerous in residential areas, Liberals in agricultural areas, and Labour in industrial areas, which gives the minority any representation at all. It is not to be expected that these

The Reason Why

accidental inequalities should cancel each other out. Indeed, it is notorious that they do not do so.

Another source of misrepresentation which applies as much to two parties as to three is that a big majority gets the same representation as a small one. In a city with 220,000 electors, if the Blue party numbers 100,000 and the Red party 120,000, the Red party ought to have the larger representation. But if the city is split up into five single-member constituencies, and the Red party is concentrated in two of these with majorities of 20,000 in one and 12,000 in the other, the other three divisions will certainly be won by the Blues. Indeed, the disproportion may be much greater than this. A majority of 10,000 wins one seat; ten majorities averaging 1,000 win ten seats.

The injustice may be deliberately caused, a process for which the term "gerrymandering" has been invented after the name of a State Governor in the United States, who practised it successfully. It is a bitter grievance of the Nationalists of Northern Ireland that when P.R. was abolished by the Ulster Government, first as regards local, then as regards parliamentary elections, the new constituencies were so arranged that, where it was impossible to avoid having a Nationalist majority, as much of the Nationalist population as possible should be included in the constituency. The result has been a very serious under-representation of Catholics and Nationalists. Anyone who examines the electoral figures impartially, or who, say, looks at the electoral map showing the configuration of the South Fermanagh division for the House of Commons

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of Northern Ireland, cannot but conclude that there is substance in the grievance.

To sum up the matter shortly, the division of the country into electoral areas returning one member each is incompatible with fair representation, because whatever the respective strength of parties, only one party can be represented. Where there are three candidates the elected member may represent as little as 34 per cent of the electorate; with four candidates, even less. The need for reform cannot be avoided by "going back to the two-party system." So long as single-member representation prevails, a party with a 10 per cent majority may still win 90 per cent of the seats, and a majority of 19,000 will obtain one-tenth of the representation obtained by ten majorities of 1,900.

4

The Second Ballot and the Alternative Vote

THE evils described in the previous chapter are inherent in the single-member constituency, and any plan of reform which retains that constituency is foredoomed to failure. The single-member constituency and representative government are incompatible. This rules out the two proposals which have been put forward as rivals to P.R., namely, the Second Ballot and the Alternative Vote. The Second Ballot has, in addition, grave drawbacks of its own and is not likely to be seriously advocated in this country. Both these proposals have the same purpose. Retaining the principle of one member to one constituency, they aim at reducing the election to a contest between the two most popular candidates. The Second Ballot does this by successive elections; the Alternative Vote by a limited use of the Transferable Vote. Ordinarily in Great Britain the number of candidates does not exceed three; hence the title "Alternative Vote." The preference which can be exercised is between two candidates only, and both of them are opposed to the party to which the elector has given his first choice. The preference is exercised on the principle: "Of two evils choose the less."

The Second Ballot, as its name implies, means the holding of a second election whenever no candidate

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has a clear majority. If there were only three candidates originally, the matter is simple. The bottom candidate is excluded and the second election is held between the other two. Where there were more than three candidates to begin with, various methods are possible. The fairest, but at the same time the most cumbrous and the most expensive, is to hold successive elections at short intervals, excluding on each occasion the candidate who was at the bottom of the poll at the election immediately preceding, until the candidates are reduced to two. A simpler but less satisfactory plan is to hold two elections only, excluding on the second occasion all candidates except the top two. Yet a third plan is to allow all the candidates to compete unless they voluntarily retire, which some of them usually do, and to give the seat to the candidate with the biggest vote, even though he may not have a clear majority.

The first disadvantage of the Second Ballot is the cost, which may be considerable. At the 1929 election in Great Britain more than half the members were elected on a minority vote. In all these cases a second election would have been necessary. Still more serious is the difficulty of getting the voters to come to the poll a second time within a week or a fortnight. Many of them simply will not go, and the result of the second poll may not be a real expression of the feeling of the constituency.

Most serious of all is the opportunity offered for unwholesome and corrupt bargaining. Some sixteen or seventeen countries have at one time or another used the Second Ballot, but they have all found it unsatis-

The Second Ballot

factory, and all except France have ultimately abandoned it. This is the description given some years ago by *The Times* correspondent who had watched the system in operation in France:

"These second ballots are the recognized occasion for all sorts of unprincipled and corrupt alliances between parties and candidates. They go far to poison the parliamentary and political life of France; and open preparations for alliances of the kind have been made in certain quarters for many months."

(*The Times*, April 20, 1928.)

The Alternative Vote is more plausible. It is in use in Canada and Australia, and is not without its advocates at home. Indeed, it was the accepted policy of the Labour party in the 1929 Parliament. By the use of the Transferable Vote it accomplishes in one operation what the Second Ballot does in two. An illustration taken from an actual election will show how it works. Major Owen, Liberal, was elected for Carnarvonshire in November 1935 in a three-cornered fight on a minority vote. The figures were:

Major G. Owen	(Liberal)	17,947
W. E. Jones	(Labour)	16,450
Prof. J. E. Daniel	(Independent)	2,534

Major Owen's supporters would have put the figure 1 against his name, and could, if they desired, have marked the figure 2 against the name of the Labour or the Independent candidate. Similarly, the Labour voters could have given a second choice to Major Owen or Professor Daniel, and Professor Daniel's

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supporters to either the Liberal or the Labour candidate. In the result it would not have mattered at all what the Liberal or Labour voters did; their second choices would not be looked at. The second choices of Professor Daniel's adherents would have determined the election. Suppose 2,000 of them had marked a second choice, 1,500 for Jones and 500 for Owen, Major Owen would still have been elected with 18,447 votes (17,947 plus 500) against Mr. Jones's 17,950 (16,450 plus 1,500). If, however, 1,800 of Daniel's supporters had given their second choice to Jones and only 200 to Owen, then Jones would have headed the poll by a narrow margin with 18,250 votes (16,450 plus 1,800) against Owen 18,147 (17,947 plus 200).

Again, in North-West Camberwell at the same election, Major Guest was elected in a three-cornered fight by a majority of 813, the figures being:

Major O. Guest	(Conservative)	11,744
H. S. J. Hughes	(Labour)	10,931
H. J. Edwards	(Liberal)	1,462

Major Guest was a minority member, his poll being less than that of his two opponents combined. If the Liberal second choices had been given sufficiently solidly for Mr. Hughes to wipe out Major Guest's majority of 813, Mr. Hughes would have been declared elected.

The curious position arises that the smallest party has the casting vote between its two sets of opponents, but gets no representation of its own. The opportunity for intrigue is not so great as with the Second Ballot,

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but is there none the less. Where it is known beforehand, as it frequently is, what candidate will be at the bottom, and where an absolute majority is improbable or uncertain, there is a strong temptation for the other two candidates to angle for the support of the minority in whose hands their fate lies. In the expressive phrase of a French statesman, the winner in such case is the "prisoner of the minority." If he looks for re-election he must avoid offending those, not of his own party, who hold his fate in their hands.

Finally, the most fatal objection to the Alternative Vote is that it does not ensure fair representation. It may even give worse results than our present system. Where three parties are competing, it puts it in the power of any temporary combination of two of them to annihilate, or almost annihilate, the third. On two occasions in the election of the Australian Senate a combination of the Nationalists and the Country party has completely annihilated the Labour party. In the election of 1925 the Nationalists and Country party combined polled 1,537,282 votes and secured all the 22 seats. The Labour party, with 1,262,912 votes, secured none. In the election of 1934 the Government forces, including the United Australia party and the United Country party, polled 1,744,021 votes and secured all the 18 seats. Labour, with 1,358,196 votes, secured none.

Our own recent electoral history may afford us glimpses of how the Alternative Vote would operate. In the election of 1931 there was a tacit alliance between the Conservative and Liberal supporters of

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the National Government. Whenever a Liberal stood down in favour of a Conservative or a Conservative in favour of a Liberal, the result was much the same as if both parties had contested the seat under the Alternative Vote system and had given their second preferences to each other. The result was the most unrepresentative House of Commons of modern times. Labour representation was reduced to 52 (including six members whose return was unopposed) in a House of 615, or one member for every 144,000 votes polled.

The Alternative Vote, like our present system, compels the electors of a minority party to vote for someone they do not want, or else lose their vote. What good is it to me, if my candidate is bottom of the poll, to tell me that I am at liberty to vote for one of the other two? I do not want to. I want to have my own views represented. It is my right as a citizen to have some voice in the constitution of an assembly on the action of which my welfare and the safety of my country so largely depend.

Under P.R. I should equally be asked to give a second choice, but I could give it to someone with whose opinions I agree. It makes a world of difference. In the first case I am still for practical purposes disfranchised. In the second, my citizenship is restored to me.

It will be seen from the above that it was with good reason that the Alternative Vote was decisively rejected by the parliamentary conference which sat in 1929-30 under the presidency of Viscount Ullswater, a former Speaker of the House of Commons, to consider changes

The Second Ballot

in our electoral law. The conference consisted of twenty-one members, eight Conservatives, eight Labour members, and five Liberals. The majority of the conference, including the whole of the Conservative and Liberal delegations, resolved that:

“Any change in the present system of parliamentary elections should include the adoption of proportional representation with the single transferable vote.”

This agreement is the more remarkable, as some of the Conservative delegation certainly came to the conference with a prejudice against P.R. They indicated at the conclusion that they were not prepared to agree to the Alternative Vote under any circumstances. The attitude of the Labour delegation was made clear in a declaration which said that “none of them was willing to support the Alternative Vote *per se*, but some of them were prepared to accept it on condition that other reforms were adopted at the same time.”

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What P.R. Is

THE essentials of Proportional Representation are two, the union of constituencies and the Transferable Vote, and of these two the former is by far the most important. With five-member constituencies it is possible to get reasonably fair representation even under our present method of voting by putting a cross against one name. In single-member areas it is impossible to obtain fair representation until a formula can be devised for trisecting a member. One member can represent only one party.

The fact that five members will be elected together instead of in five separate divisions makes no difference to the fact that each elector is entitled to one vote only. His right is to assist in electing his own representative. He has no right to prevent other people from exercising the same right. The rule by which, in two-member constituencies like Derby and Norwich, each elector is allowed to vote for two candidates is wrong. It allows a bare majority to monopolize the representation. The case would be still worse if he were allowed to vote for five candidates in a five-member constituency. If the Red candidates polled 80,000 votes, the Blues 70,000, and the Yellows 60,000, the constituency would be represented entirely by Reds. True, there might be a certain amount of cross-voting, but except where a

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candidate has a strong hold on the locality it is usually insignificant in comparison with the total vote.

Where each elector has one vote, the case is altered. In a poll of 100,000 a party with 20,000 supporters can, by concentrating on one candidate, secure his return. With 40,000 supporters it can return two members, and so on. This combination of the large constituency with the rule of voting by putting a cross against one name is known as the single non-transferable vote, and is the method in use in Japan. Under it any party can secure fair representation which has an accurate knowledge of its own strength and is prepared to vote together. The position may be compared to that created by the "limited vote," which was in force in Birmingham and one or two other cities and a number of counties from 1868 to 1885. Birmingham returned three members, but no elector could vote for more than two candidates. There were enough Liberal electors to secure the return of three Liberal members, *provided the vote was properly distributed*. But if too many electors should vote for Bright and Muntz, Chamberlain, then a comparatively unknown man, might be defeated. So careful instructions were given to the electors in the different wards, some to vote Bright and Muntz, others to vote Bright and Chamberlain, and the remainder Chamberlain and Muntz. The result was a triumphant success for the party organization. Bright, Chamberlain, and Muntz were all returned. Obviously these tactics required a very exact knowledge of the party's voting strength or they might have resulted in losing a seat instead of gaining one.

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The TRANSFERABLE VOTE gets rid of these difficulties, and by making the elector master in his own house, automatically ensures a representation which is in accordance with the facts. There are two ways in which a party may be deprived of its just due, the split vote and the big majority. If a party which can poll one quota but not two, over-estimates its strength and puts up two candidates, the vote may be split between them and both may be defeated. But suppose the party *has* got enough votes to secure the return of both its candidates; it may still lose a seat it ought to win through its vote being unequally divided between the two. Suppose Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. and Mrs. Nobody were Conservative candidates for a Birmingham division with five seats. The Conservatives, we will suppose, are strong enough to return all three; but if nineteen-twentieths of them give their votes to Mr. Chamberlain, the party will win one seat only instead of three.

The Transferable Vote meets both these situations and does so without any resort to the party machine, simply by giving effect to the will of the voter. If the voter says, "Mr. Chamberlain is the only candidate fit to represent the division," he will put down the figure 1 against Mr. Chamberlain's name and leave the rest of the voting paper blank. His vote will be perfectly in order. It will be used to help elect Mr. Chamberlain and will not be transferred to anyone else. A vote is only transferred when the elector himself makes it transferable, and then only to the candidate whom the elector has indicated. Suppose the voter

What P.R. Is

says, as the majority of Conservatives are certain to say, "I want the Conservative party to win as many seats as possible. Mr. Chamberlain's return is more important than anything else, but if he is already in before my vote is counted, use it to help Mr. Nobody, or, failing him, Mrs. Nobody." In that case his voting paper will read:

Chamberlain	1
Nobody	2
Mrs. Nobody	3

and the returning officer will carry out the voter's expressed intention. The voter is perfectly free to do what he wishes. Cross-voting is not prohibited. If he chooses to say, "Mr. Chamberlain should come first because he is a national figure, but if his return is assured I want to help the Liberal (or the Socialist)," he will vote, in the first case supposed:

Chamberlain	1
Liberal	2

and in the other:

Chamberlain	1
Socialist	2

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Or he may put it the other way, and say: "I want first of all to help elect the Liberal (or the Socialist), but if I cannot do that, Mr. Chamberlain is the next best." In these conditions he will vote, in the one case—Liberal 1, Chamberlain 2; and in the other—Socialist 1, Chamberlain 2. (*See Form of Ballot Paper, page 112.*)

A word of explanation is needed as to the quota. The quota is the number of votes necessary to secure election. Obviously, if there are five members to be elected, none of them can be expected to have an absolute majority. If five men or women have a fifth of the votes each, they must be the winning team, and at first sight it is natural to suppose that in a five-member constituency the quota will be one-fifth of the total vote. A little reflection will show that this figure is too high. If the five winners have each one-fifth of the votes, the unsuccessful candidate or candidates can have no votes at all. There must be at least six candidates for the five places or no election would be necessary. If these six had each one-sixth of the votes, there would be a tie all round. But if any candidate has more than a sixth, somebody must have less than a sixth. The candidate who can poll anything above one-sixth of the total vote must be one of the five winners. The quota is therefore found by dividing the total poll by six (neglecting fractions) and adding one. A simple example will serve to test the rule. If 100 votes are polled and there is one member to be elected, 51 votes will ensure his election. The quota for one member is $\frac{100}{2}$ plus one. If there are two members to be elected,

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the quota is $\frac{100}{3}$ plus one, or 34; if three, the quota is 26; if four, 21. If four candidates have 21 votes each out of 100 votes recorded, no other candidate can have more than 16.

Many people are afraid that under P.R. their vote may be given away to someone for whom they never intended it. That is a complete misapprehension. P.R. is the voter's charter of freedom. It enables him to get full value for his vote. Experience has shown that he will allow no party organization to deprive him of this liberty. In Ireland no party which is running more than one candidate dare say to the elector: "Give your first choice to Mr. Brown." To do so would be to ensure Brown's defeat. The party organization prints the names of its candidates in heavy type and says to its supporters: "Give your preferences 1, 2, 3, to these candidates *in the order of your choice.*"

These preferences are NOT additional votes. If your vote has been used to elect your first choice, it has fulfilled its purpose and other choices will not be looked at. As will be explained later, a vote may in effect be used in certain circumstances partly for the first choice and partly for a later choice, but in no case will the voter be able to secure more than the value of one full vote.

It remains only to consider the constituencies which will be formed when P.R. is brought into operation. These will no doubt be determined after local enquiry, but they are not likely to differ materially from the constituencies set out in the scheme passed by the

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House of Lords as an amendment to the *Representation of the People Bill*, 1918. These will be found in Appendix I. The policy of the Proportional Representation Society throughout its existence has been to restore, as far as possible, the old historical constituencies which were done away with in 1885, and make the city or county the normal unit of representation. Very populous counties like Lancashire and Yorkshire require, of course, special treatment. Very large counties constitute three or four or even more divisions, while huge sparsely populated areas such as the Highlands of Scotland are left as single-member areas. No alteration of boundaries is required to bring this scheme into operation, but merely a union of existing constituencies. Nor need there be any alteration in the number of members. Bristol is now divided into five purely artificial divisions returning one member each. Under P.R., the city of Bristol will be one unit returning five members who will jointly represent the city.

At the same time it is obvious that P.R. will immensely facilitate the process of redistribution to meet the changes of population. Instead of having to cut a division in two, or to consider laboriously what parishes and rural or urban districts shall be taken from constituency A and added to constituency B, all that will be needed will be to add one member to constituencies which have grown sufficiently and take one from those which have fallen back. Constituency B which had four members, will now have five, while constituency A, which had five, will have to be content with four.

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An Actual Election

FOR the benefit of those interested, I propose to illustrate from an actual election the way in which the returning officer gives effect to the will of the voter as recorded on his ballot paper and uses his second or subsequent preference, where this is necessary, in order to make his vote effective. For this purpose I select the election for the city of Cork at the general election of 1933. I was myself present throughout this election and was admitted to watch the count.

Cork returns five members to the Dáil, and for these five places there were ten candidates. It is worth noting in the first place that no party put up five candidates. It was certain beforehand that with a fair system of election no party could hope to sweep the board. The strongest party in Cork was the Cosgrave or Cumann na nGaedhael party. They put up four candidates, of whom Mr. Cosgrave himself was one. Mr. de Valera's party, Fianna Fail, put up three, and the remaining three consisted of one Labour candidate, one Farmers' party representative, and one independent.

The case of Mr. Anthony, the independent candidate, is interesting. He had been a Labour candidate, but when the Labour party allied itself with Mr. de Valera, he declared himself a supporter of the treaty with England and stood as an independent, giving general

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support to Mr. Cosgrave. It is sometimes said that in a large constituency a candidate without the support of a party machine will stand no chance. Irish experience does not support that. Even on the first count Mr. Anthony stood third. He was, in addition, the second choice of many voters of the Cosgrave party, and he was the third candidate to be elected, coming next after the leaders of the two big parties. There is a great difference between an election where a candidate has to get a majority and an election where he has only to secure a quota. Mr. Anthony was a man of engaging personality and a frank and outspoken speaker; and a man whose character stands high can, under P.R., draw his poll from a much wider area than under our parochial conditions.

After the first count, at which first choices only were looked at, the poll stood thus:

<i>Candidates</i>		<i>Votes (first choices)</i>	
Cosgrave	(C.G.)	14,863	Elected
Flynn	(F.F.)	12,696	Elected
Anthony	(I.Lab.)	5,719	
Hurley	(Lab.)	5,248	
Dowdall	(F.F.)	5,067	
French	(F.F.)	3,812	
Horgan	(C.G.)	2,168	
Duggan	(Centre)	2,111	
Egan	(C.G.)	1,995	
Desmond	(C.G.)	1,533	

Total 55,212

The total poll was 55,212. Dividing this by one more than the number of members to be elected, that is by 6, and adding 1, we get 9,203 as the quota of votes needed

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to secure election. A sum in simple multiplication will show that five times 9,203 is 46,015, so that when five members have secured a quota, the largest number of votes that any sixth candidate can have out of a total poll of 55,212 is 9,197, which is less than a quota. If the quota were fixed even a unit lower, viz. 9,202, it would be just possible for all six candidates to tie.

The quota having been determined, it is at once seen that two candidates, Messrs. Cosgrave and Flynn, the one belonging to Cumann na nGaedhael, and the other to Fianna Fail, have secured quotas. They are declared duly elected in this order.

The substantial alignment of candidates was between those who wished to uphold the treaty with Great Britain by which the Free State was constituted, and those who wished to repudiate it. In fact, in spite of there being four parties and an independent, the election came nearer to being a fight between two parties than any we have had in Great Britain since the war. Taking this alignment of pro-Treaty and anti-Treaty, and reckoning the Labour candidate Hurley as anti-Treaty, there was still a preponderance in favour of the treaty of 1,500 votes. The preponderance was actually rather greater, as some of Hurley's supporters disregarded his advice and gave their second choice to Cosgrave candidates. But if the first five names at the first count had been declared elected without regard to whether they had obtained a quota or not, this result would have been reversed and there would have been three anti-Treaty members and only two pro-Treaty. The whole of Mr. Cosgrave's large

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surplus of 5,660 votes (more than the total poll of any candidate except the top three) would have been wasted, and would have been of no benefit either to him or to his party.

The next step, clearly, is to transfer the surplus votes of Mr. Cosgrave and Mr. Flynn so that the parties to which those two leaders belonged shall not be penalized by having a too popular candidate, and the voters who supported them shall not be left with the knowledge that if they had distributed their votes differently they would have got a better result. If the votes to be transferred were selected at random, a certain element of chance enters into the process. Statistical investigation and the law of averages show that this element of chance is much smaller than is popularly supposed. When the sample taken is large, it will correspond very closely to the whole.

The element of chance can, however, be eliminated altogether. The method is this. All the votes of the candidate having the surplus are re-sorted and stacked in pigeon-holes according to the second choice marked on them. From each pigeon-hole the same proportion of votes is taken, that proportion being just sufficient to make up the surplus to be transferred. Take first the simplest possible case. Suppose Mr. Cosgrave had received exactly twice the number of votes he required. Suppose the quota had been 9,000 and Mr. Cosgrave's poll 18,000. Suppose, further, that all these 18,000 voters had marked a second choice in favour of one or other of Mr. Cosgrave's colleagues, Messrs. Desmond, Egan, and Horgan, Desmond being named on 9,000

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papers, Egan on 6,000, and Horgan on 3,000. All that the returning officer would have to do would be to take half the votes from each pigeon-hole and credit Mr. Desmond with 4,500 additional votes, Mr. Egan with 3,000, and Mr. Horgan with 1,500, making a total of 9,000, the remaining 9,000 being retained to form Mr. Cosgrave's quota. Thus the number of extra votes credited to each candidate is exactly in proportion to the number of papers on which his name appears as second choice.

The voter has no means of knowing whether his particular ballot paper has been transferred to his second choice or retained to form part of Mr. Cosgrave's quota, nor does it matter in the least. As indicated in Chapter 5, the result in the supposed case is exactly the same as if each of Mr. Cosgrave's 18,000 supporters had given half a vote to Mr. Cosgrave and half a vote to his second choice, and this result is reached automatically by re-sorting all the 18,000 votes according to the second choices marked on them and transferring the correct proportion.

In practice, of course, the calculation is never quite so simple as this, and it is necessary that the returning officer or some members of his staff shall be capable of working out a series of sums in long division. This is the whole extent of the so-called "mathematical" element in P.R.! Most of Mr. Cosgrave's supporters recorded a second choice in favour either of another candidate of the same party or of Mr. Anthony, but there was some cross-voting and every remaining candidate received some extra votes as a result of the transfer.

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Seventy-three of Mr. Cosgrave's papers showed no second choice. These were used to form part of Mr. Cosgrave's quota. They could not, of course, be used in re-sorting the votes to ascertain the number of second choices. The table opposite shows in the second column the number of second choices in favour of each candidate out of the 14,790 transferable votes.

The number of votes to be transferred is found in each case by multiplying the figures in column 2 by the fraction $\frac{S}{T}$, where S is Mr. Cosgrave's surplus, and T the number of transferable votes received by him.

In this case the fraction is $\frac{5660}{14790}$, or $\frac{566}{1479}$. If the fractions in column 3 are ignored, the number of votes to be transferred comes to 5,657, which is three short of the full surplus. In order to make up the deficiency the three largest fractions are treated as whole numbers, the remainder being ignored. The result is shown in column 4. This small additional complication arises from the fact that you cannot tear a ballot paper into fractions. The number of votes to be transferred in each case must be a whole number.

The name of Mr. Flynn does not appear in the table, he having been already elected. Where his name appeared as second choice it was passed over and the third choice looked at. The rules dealing with the transfer of votes do not speak of the "second choice," but of the "next available preference."

The relative position of the last four candidates has now changed considerably. The two leaders being

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safely home, Anthony with 6,943 votes (5,719 plus 1,224) still leads the field. Hurley, although he has only received 74 new votes, is still fourth with 5,322, and

TRANSFER OF COSGRAVE'S SURPLUS

Number of surplus votes 5,660

Number of Cosgrave's first preferences which are transferable 14,790

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{Proportion of votes} \\ \text{to be transferred} \end{array} \right\} = \frac{\text{Surplus (S)}}{\text{Transferable papers (T)}} = \frac{5660}{14790}, \text{ or } \frac{566}{1479}$$

<i>Column 1</i>	<i>Column 2</i>	<i>Column 3</i>	<i>Column 4</i>
<i>Name of candidate indicated as next available preference after Cosgrave</i>	<i>Number of papers on which candidate's name appears as next available preference</i>	<i>Votes to be transferred (figure in column 2 multiplied by $\frac{566}{1479}$)</i>	<i>Actual number of votes transferred (whole numbers only)</i>
Desmond (C.G.)	5,825	2,229 $\frac{113}{1479}$	2,229
Egan (C.G.)	3,627	1,388 $\frac{113}{1479}$	1,388
Anthony (I.Lab.)	3,198	1,224 $\frac{113}{1479}$	1,224
Horgan (C.G.)	1,129	432 $\frac{89}{1479}$	432
Duggan (Centre)	572	219 $\frac{113}{1479}$	219
Hurley (Lab.)	193	74 $\frac{113}{1479}$	74
Dowdall (F.F.)	170	65 $\frac{89}{1479}$	65
French (F.F.)	76	29 $\frac{89}{1479}$	29
Total	14,790	5,660	5,660

Dowdall is fifth as before with 5,132 (5,067 plus 65), and French sixth with 3,841 (3,812 plus 29). Desmond, however, has come up from bottom to the seventh place with 3,762 (1,533 plus 2,229) and is now close behind

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French, whom he will eventually outstrip. Egan with 3,383 (1,995 plus 1,388) and Horgan with 2,600 (2,168 plus 432) follow in this order, and Duggan, the Centre party man, who has added only 219 to his original 2,111, is now at the bottom. Mr. Cosgrave is left with his bare quota of 9,203, but, of course, no transfer of votes subsequent to his election can affect his position as senior member for the city.

The same process was now applied to Mr. Flynn's smaller surplus of 3,493 votes. In this case there was very little cross-voting. Mr. Flynn's colleagues, French and Dowdall, received respectively 1,744 and 1,524 transferred votes, and Mr. Hurley, who was in general alliance with Fianna Fail, 195 votes. No other candidate received as many as ten (Anthony 8, Desmond 3, Egan 6, Horgan 4, Duggan 9). The poll now stood :

THIRD COUNT

<i>Candidates</i>		<i>Votes</i>	
Cosgrave	(C.G.)	9,203	Elected
Flynn	(F.F.)	9,203	Elected
Anthony	(I.Lab.)	6,951	
Dowdall	(F.F.)	6,656	
French	(F.F.)	5,585	
Hurley	(Lab.)	5,517	
Desmond	(C.G.)	3,765	
Egan	(C.G.)	3,389	
Horgan	(C.G.)	2,604	
Duggan	(Centre)	2,339	

Total 55,212

The total of votes remains unaltered, as it should do throughout if the transfers are properly made. (The

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returning officer for Oxford University on one occasion failed to observe this rule, with the result that the number of votes appeared to vary as the elections went on. The error in no way affected the result, but was a source of bewilderment to those who did not realize what had happened, and of unholy glee to those who did.)

No candidate has obtained a quota as a result of the transfer of the two surpluses, and the next step is to eliminate the candidate at the bottom of the poll. This was the Centre party man, Con Duggan, "The People's Friend," as he called himself conspicuously on a placard fixed to a buoy in the middle of the River Lee. Under the British system Mr. Duggan's votes would simply have been wasted. No further notice would have been taken of them, and his supporters would have been able neither to obtain representation nor to use their vote on the great issue of the day, the maintenance of the Treaty with Great Britain. In Ireland that is not so. Any voter who had recorded a second choice in favour of one or the other pro-Treaty candidates could have his vote counted in favour of that candidate. More than 1,900 of Mr. Duggan's 2,339 supporters had done so. A few had given a next choice for a Fianna Fail candidate or for Labour, and 67 had given no further choice at all. These 67 votes were necessarily wasted. In transferring Mr. Duggan's votes there was no arithmetical process involved but that of simple addition. Every vote containing a further choice could be, and was treated as a vote for that choice.

As the transfer of Duggan's votes, though largely

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benefiting Desmond and Anthony, failed to give anyone a quota, it was followed successively by the elimination of Horgan and Egan and the transfer of such of their votes as were still transferable. The last of these transfers brought Anthony up to the quota and even gave him a small surplus which had in turn to be transferred. There now remained for the last two places :

Desmond	(C.G.)	with 8,880 votes
Dowdall	(F.F.)	with 6,896 votes
French	(F.F.)	with 5,824 votes
Hurley	(Lab.)	with 5,785 votes

Hurley's votes were the last to be transferred. His 5,785 votes included 458 papers on which no further choice was marked. Of the remainder, 2,835 went to French, 2,127 to Dowdall, and 365 to Desmond. The poll at this, the final, stage stood :

FINAL COUNT

<i>Candidates</i>		<i>Votes</i>	
Cosgrave	(C.G.)	9,203	Elected
Flynn	(F.F.)	9,203	Elected
Anthony	(I.Lab.)	9,203	Elected
Desmond	(C.G.)	9,245	Elected
Dowdall	(F.F.)	9,023	Elected
French	(F.F.)	8,659	Not Elected
Non-transferable papers		676	
Total		55,212	

Desmond has now obtained a quota and forty-two votes over. It was unnecessary to transfer this small surplus as even if the whole of it had gone to French he would still have been below Dowdall. Dowdall,

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though he is 180 votes short of a quota, is declared elected to the last place as the higher of the only two candidates left in.

Nearly 46,000 out of the 55,000 electors who voted had the satisfaction of knowing that they had given an effective vote and had contributed to the election of one or other of the five members chosen to represent the city. They had also had the opportunity, which our system does not give them, of selecting between candidates of the same party, and so securing a member who was personally as well as politically acceptable.

Public interest in the election was intense. The poll was very heavy, over 82 per cent. Large crowds gathered to hear the result of each successive count, both outside the secondary school where the counting took place, and at the headquarters of the Fianna Fail party, where the state of the poll and the result of each successive count was placarded a few minutes after the result of each count was declared.

Eight counts may seem a very elaborate process for arriving at the result of an election, but it must be remembered that all counts after the first are concerned with only a fraction of the total votes. Each of them is a re-sorting of the votes of one candidate. The third count, for instance, only involved just over 2,000 votes, while in the largest operation, the transfer of Mr. Cosgrave's surplus, the number of votes to be recounted was less than 15,000.

NOTE.—The percentage of votes rendered invalid from all causes was 0·92 per cent in Cork City and 1·05 per cent in the Irish Free State as a whole.—A. J. G.

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PUBLIC NOTICE OF THE RESULT OF THE

CONSTITUENCY OF THE CITY OF

Number of valid votes 55,212

Quota (number of votes sufficient to secure

Names of Candidates	1st Count	2nd Count		3rd Count		4th Count	
	Votes polled by each candidate	Transfer of surplus votes of Cosgrave	Result	Transfer of surplus votes of Flynn	Result	Transfer of votes of Duggan	Result
Anthony (I.Lab.)	5,719	+ 1,224	6,943	+ 8	6,951	+ 687	7,638
Cosgrave (C.G.)	14,863	- 5,660	9,203		9,203		9,203
Desmond (C.G.)	1,533	+ 2,229	3,762	+ 3	3,765	+ 751	4,516
Dowdall (F.F.)	5,067	+ 65	5,132	+ 1,524	6,656	+ 108	6,764
Duggan (Centre)	2,111	+ 219	2,330	+ 9	2,339	- 2,339	—
Egan (C.G.)	1,995	+ 1,388	3,383	+ 6	3,389	+ 443	3,832
Flynn (F.F.)	12,696		12,696	- 3,493	9,203		9,203
French (F.F.)	3,812	+ 29	3,841	+ 1,744	5,585	+ 112	5,697
Horgan (C.G.)	2,168	+ 432	2,600	+ 4	2,604	+ 92	2,696
Hurley (Lab.)	5,248	+ 74	5,322	+ 195	5,517	+ 79	5,596
Non-transferable Papers						+ 67	67
Totals	55,212	—	55,212	—	55,212	—	55,212

An Actual Election

ELECTION AND OF THE TRANSFER OF VOTES

CORK (I.F.S. GENERAL ELECTION, 1933)

Number of members to be elected 5

the election of a candidate) .. 9,203

5th Count		6th Count		7th Count		8th Count		Elected Candidates
Transfer of votes of Horgan	Result	Transfer of votes of Egan	Result	Transfer of surplus votes of Anthony	Result	Transfer of votes of Hurley	Result	
+ 644	8,282	+ 1,131	9,413	- 210	9,203		9,203	Anthony
	9,203		9,203		9,203		9,203	Cosgrave
+ 772	5,288	+ 3,405	8,693	+ 187	8,880	+ 365	9,245	Desmond
+ 36	6,800	+ 90	6,890	+ 6	6,896	+ 2,127	9,023	Dowdall
	—		—		—		—	
+ 1,084	4,916	- 4,916	—		—		—	
	9,203		9,203		9,203		9,203	Flynn
+ 48	5,745	+ 76	5,821	+ 3	5,824	+ 2,835	8,659	
- 2,696	—		—		—		—	
+ 77	5,673	+ 98	5,771	+ 14	5,785	- 5,785	—	
+ 35	102	+ 116	218		218	+ 458	676	
—	55,212	—	55,212	—	55,212	—	55,212	

Continental Methods: A Brief Note on List Systems of P.R.

THE first application of P.R. on the Continent was made under the Danish Electoral Law of 1855. It was a form of the single transferable vote, of which the author was Carl Georg Andrae, Finance Minister and afterwards Premier. The system was applied in the election of the Rigsraad, the Federal Council for Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein. The Rigsraad ceased to exist after the loss of the duchies in the war with Prussia in 1864, but the transferable vote is still used in the second stage of the election of members of the Upper House of Denmark.

With this exception, P.R. on the Continent has invariably taken the form of what is known as a list system. The various parties draw up lists of candidates in each constituency, and the voter puts a cross against the list he favours, though he may in most cases give a personal vote to a particular candidate as well. Unless he does so he is assumed to have voted for the candidates in the order in which their names appear on the list. This, of course, puts very large power into the hands of the party organization. A candidate's prospects of election depend very largely on the place assigned to him in the list.

The most usual methods of deciding how many seats

Continental Methods

to allot to each party list are either to calculate the quota and assign to each list as many seats as the number of quotas polled by it, giving any odd seats to the lists with the largest remainders, or what is known as the d'Hondt method. The d'Hondt method operates in this way. Suppose that in a five-member constituency there are four party lists with votes as under:

List A	90,000
List B	75,000
List C	40,000
List D	24,000

The poll obtained by each list is divided successively by 1, 2, 3 . . . as far as may be necessary, and one seat is assigned to each of the five largest quotients.

The process of division gives the following result:

List A	90,000	45,000	30,000	22,500
List B	75,000	37,500	25,000	
List C	40,000	20,000		
List D	24,000			

The five largest quotients are:

List A	90,000
List B	75,000
List A	45,000
List C	40,000
List B	37,500

Two candidates from List A, two from List B, and one from List C are declared duly elected. The result is the same as if the fifth largest quotient were taken as the quota and one seat assigned for every quota contained

The Case for Electoral Reform

in the various lists. List A will be found to have two quotas, List B two, and List C one.

In Germany one member was assigned for every 60,000 votes cast, so that while the quota remained constant the number of members representing any electoral district, and the total number for the Reich, was liable to vary from time to time.

Fuller information will be found in Hoag and Hallett's *Proportional Representation* (The Macmillan Company, 1926).

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The Case Against P.R.

THERE is no reform, however beneficent, which is not accompanied by some drawbacks, and P.R. is not exempt from this universal rule. But before considering criticisms not wholly devoid of substance, it is necessary to clear the ground of a large number of imaginary disadvantages. The person who wrote :

**"I do not like thee, Dr. Fell;
The reason why I cannot tell"**

was not only honest but exceptional. Most people, when they dislike somebody or something, are at pains to find a reason for their dislike, and are willing to catch at any convenient reason that is offered them.

There are many people who dislike the idea of large constituencies, either because it involves change in the methods of political organization with which they are familiar, or from mere antipathy to novelty, or even for the reason given me on one occasion by the Chairwoman of a Women's Conservative Association. I had been urging on her the importance of getting real and not false representation when she replied naively, "But wouldn't that reduce the Conservative majority?" When it is suggested to people in this frame of mind that P.R. has been tried abroad and found wanting, they jump at the idea. It never occurs to them to ask

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why, if P.R. has worked so badly, the countries which suffer from it do not give it up and go back to our system. P.R. is the settled method of election in the best educated and most enlightened countries of Europe, in Sweden, in Norway, in Denmark, in Czechoslovakia, in Holland, in Belgium, in Switzerland. It is not, however, in force in either France or Spain. It is worth while stressing this last point, as "We don't want to be like France" is one of the stock replies to P.R. propaganda. It is like holding up a man as an awful example of the evils of drink, and then discovering that he is a lifelong teetotaler. Clearly some other explanation must be found for his illness!

Another class of controversialists ignore experience altogether. They begin by describing P.R. as a system which is excellent in theory but will never work in practice, and then put forward a number of objections which, unlike the system they attack, really are theoretical, and which a reference to experience would at once demolish. Of this nature are the objections that the system is too difficult, that the voters will never understand it, that there will be many spoiled papers, that compulsion will be needed to induce the voters to go to the poll. To all of which the simple answer is that the voter finds no difficulty at all in voting by expressing a preference, that the number of spoiled papers is not large, that voting is a more interesting and more intelligent process than where there is one candidate only of each party, and that the voter responds by going to the poll in larger numbers. The idea of difficulty in voting is due largely to a confusion between the

The Case Against P.R.

actual process of voting, which is quite simple, and the counting of the votes, which is admittedly rather more complicated than under the single-member system. This latter is the job of the returning officer and his staff. The elector is no more concerned with it than he is with the working of an automatic machine. All he is concerned with is that the machine shall give him a correct result.

The idea that P.R. will lead to the break-up of parties is in part of this nature; in part it is due to a misreading of foreign experience. So far as it is a theoretical objection, the reasoning is this. So long as each member has to secure a majority, or at least a larger vote than any other candidate, the crank and the faddist have no chance. But with five members to be chosen, the prohibitionist, the anti-vivisectionist, the Sabbatarian, and all sorts of small groups will elect their members, and we shall have a parliament of small groups where no cohesion at all will be possible. This loses sight of the fact that the five-member constituency will be five times as large as the single-member constituency and that *it takes more votes to elect a member under P.R. than it does under our present electoral system.* Take any P.R. constituency from the scheme passed by the House of Lords in 1918, and the figures of any election which has taken place since, and it will invariably be found that the quota which would have been needed for election under P.R. is larger than the average vote obtained by the successful candidates, and frequently larger than that obtained by any candidate in any of the existing divisions. The discrepancy was

The Case for Electoral Reform

greatest in the 1929 election when the number of three-cornered contests was highest, but the figures of 1935 will serve. I take at random two borough and two county constituencies in widely separated parts of the country.

In the four divisions of Bradford the highest poll was obtained by Mr. Holdsworth, M.P. for South Bradford, with 24,081 votes. The lowest poll of any successful candidate was that of Mr. Hepworth in East Bradford, who secured election with a poll of 11,131. Even if the proportion of electors going to the poll under P.R. had been the same, and it would certainly have been larger, each of the four members for the city of Bradford would have required 29,000 votes to secure election. Take next a metropolitan borough. Lambeth will serve as well as another. Lambeth returns four members in four separate constituencies. Under P.R. it would return four members as one constituency. On the 1935 vote, the quota would have been 22,087. Only one candidate, the member for Norwood, with 24,651 votes, exceeded this figure. The other three got 17,000, 12,000, and 10,000 respectively. Let us take now two county divisions, one in the west and one in the east. Denbigh and Flint was proposed as a three-member constituency. In 1935 the quota would have been just under 34,000. None of the three members actually elected secured more than 27,000. On the opposite side of the country, East Suffolk, including Ipswich, would return four members. On the 1935 figures the quota would have been 28,993. Only the member for Ipswich, Sir F. Ganzoni, with 28,528 votes, approached this figure.

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The members for the other three existing divisions were 6,000 or 7,000 short of it.

The most absurd objection of all, though it has been put forward by a learned professor, is that P.R. would increase the power of the party machine. If the professor had seen P.R. at work he would not have made this suggestion. The single transferable vote is the elector's charter of freedom. No party organization dare dictate to him how he shall exercise his preference. To do so would be to defeat its own ends. It simply tells him who the party candidates are and says, "Mark these candidates 1, 2, 3 . . . *in the order of your choice.*" On the Continent—and this is the great difference between Continental systems and the British system—the elector votes for a list of candidates prepared by party headquarters. In all British countries he votes for an individual man or woman. A man of proved ability and character who stands for a definite point of view can, as the example of Mr. Anthony in Chapter 6 shows, secure election without the backing of any party machine, but the mere freak candidate has less influence than with us. With single-member constituencies a few hundred voters with a hobby-horse can sometimes, by selling their votes to the highest bidder, turn the whole election. More often they can intimidate the candidates into thinking that they have power to do so. This was noticed as far back as 1910 by that acute observer, Arthur James Balfour, who said:

"Everybody who has watched the course of a contested election in a constituency where parties were

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fairly evenly balanced knows perfectly well the monstrous power which is given to a very small minority to exact a pledge from the candidate, not that he shall support this or that great policy, but that he should help their small and particular interest. I know nothing which is more corrupting, both to the electors and to the elected, than that process."

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The Case Against P.R., Continued

THE genuine drawbacks to P.R. appear to boil down to three:

1. It takes rather longer to get out the results.
2. It is difficult to apply to large, thinly populated areas.
3. In case of a by-election it may result in a larger constituency having to be polled.

The first objection is trivial. The second merely means that certain areas, e.g. the Highlands of Scotland, may have to be left as single-member constituencies. The third may not always be a disadvantage. When, for instance, in 1937, M. Degrelle, the Rexist leader, challenged the Prime Minister of Belgium to single combat in a by-election, the existence of P.R. enabled the contest to be fought over a sufficiently large electorate to make the result really significant.

It is, however, quite possible to avoid this alleged drawback altogether. The existing divisions could be retained for by-election purposes only. After a general election the elected members would be asked in order of seniority to choose one of these divisions, and that division alone would be polled in case of the death or resignation of the member. Take, for instance, a P.R. constituency consisting of the present Bath, Frome,

The Case for Electoral Reform

Wells, and Weston-super-Mare divisions. If the election resulted in the return of two Conservative, one Labour, and one Liberal member, the Conservative members would naturally choose Bath and Weston, where Conservatism is strongest. For similar reasons the Labour member might be expected to choose Frome and the Liberal the Wells division. I do not myself recommend this device. I doubt whether the drawbacks of the large constituency are sufficient to make its adoption worth while.

A third course is to dispense with by-elections altogether. To those who have not considered it this will seem at first sight a revolutionary proposal. By-elections are regarded as affording an index of changes of opinion occurring within the lifetime of a parliament. (They are, as statistics show, far from being a reliable index.) With a representative House of Commons their value in this respect largely disappears. Where the representation of one set of opinions is exaggerated out of all relation to reality, rapid and striking changes are to be expected. The real movement of opinion is steadier and surer but far less rapid. It is like the slow movement of the Atlantic roller compared with the choppy waves of some rocky inlet. It will register itself at a general election, but the effect of by-elections on the composition of parliament will hardly be felt. These considerations led President Cosgrave before his fall from power to the conclusion that by-elections in Ireland were an unnecessary expense, and he was contemplating legislation to do away with them. In Tasmania this has actually been done. On the occur-

The Case Against P.R., Continued

rence of a vacancy, the candidates in the constituency not elected at the general election, who consent to stand, become candidates for the vacancy. The voting papers by which the late member was elected are re-examined, and the candidate who obtains a majority in accordance with the preferences on these papers, is elected.

Another difficulty which greatly affects the minds of many people is the supposed impossibility of a candidate becoming known to the electors of a whole county, such as Oxfordshire or Berkshire or Wiltshire. It is said that there will be a loss of personal touch and that people will be voting for they know not whom. Like so many others, this is a theoretical difficulty. People draw imaginary pictures of what will occur and do not ask the practical question, "Has it occurred where the single transferable vote is in operation?" Constituencies in Ireland are as large in point of area as they will be in Great Britain, though of course much more sparsely populated, and this particular difficulty has not been found to arise. Here is the testimony of the former Assistant Secretary of the Irish Labour party, Mr. R. J. P. Mortished:

"So far as the personal element is legitimate, P.R. does not affect it. If a constituent has a grievance, he naturally writes to that one of the members elected for his constituency with whom he is most in sympathy or whom he thinks most likely to give him the needed help. FROM WHAT I KNOW OF THE EXPERIENCE OF LABOUR DEPUTIES ELECTED BY P.R., I HAVE NO DOUBT

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WHATEVER THAT THE PERSONAL CONTACT BETWEEN THEM AND THEIR CONSTITUENTS IS FULLY AS CLOSE AND KEEN AS CAN BE DESIRED. A member is freed from the necessity of nursing his constituency by over-attention to individuals both before and after his election, but that does not diminish his real responsibility to his constituents."

It may be added that P.R. encourages a larger proportion of local candidates. If a man goes from Newcastle to Cornwall to become a candidate, it is usually because he is convinced that there is no chance for him in Newcastle, but there may be a chance in Cornwall. With a county or half a county as a constituency he need not despair of being elected in the place where he belongs.

The objection really raises the fundamental question: "On what grounds do people vote and on what grounds ought they to vote? What is that personal touch which it is desirable to keep?" Ought people to vote for a man because they have shaken hands with him and he strikes them as a nice genial fellow? Lord Melchett once sarcastically observed that a pleasant manner of opening a bazaar is likely to get a man farther in politics than burning the midnight oil over problems of economics and currency. Is that true, and if so, ought it to be true?

The truth is that under present conditions personal qualities are likely to be of far more use in holding a seat after it has been won than in winning it in the first place. In an average constituency, if you have to choose between Mr. Blue and Mr. Yellow and Mr.

The Case Against P.R., Continued

Red, you do not choose between them on personal grounds but because of the kind of policy for which they stand and the kind of government to which they will give their support. If you hate Socialism like the devil, you will not vote for the Socialist candidate, however able he may be, and, conversely, if you regard Socialism as the one thing needful, you will vote for him even if you regard him as a poor specimen. Similarly, if you think the salvation of the country lies in the revival of Liberalism, you will not let personal considerations deter you from voting for the Liberal candidate.

One of the things most constantly urged as an argument against P.R. is that the object of an election is to form a government. That means that you vote for a candidate not for what he is personally, but because he is a follower of Mr. Chamberlain or Sir Archibald Sinclair or Mr. Attlee, or whoever the party leaders may be at the time. If you can get a man who is personally distinguished, all the better, but that is not the governing consideration. The proof of this is that men of the most distinguished personality, without distinction of party, have been defeated time and again whenever the tide of political opinion has run strongly against them. Sir William Harcourt at the height of his fame was defeated at Derby on a question of local option. Arthur Balfour, though he was Prime Minister, was defeated in East Manchester in 1906. Mr. Asquith was twice defeated. Philip Snowden was defeated in 1918. Arthur Henderson, at a time when he was president of the World Disarmament Conference, was

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unable to obtain a seat in the House of Commons of his own country.

I am, of course, aware that there is a large body of electors not permanently attached to any party, but even these, if they come to the poll at all, do so in the main to vote for or against the government rather than for or against the individual candidate.

How, then, does the voter get to know what the candidates stand for and decide which of them to support? Not in the majority of cases by any sort of personal contact. He may, perhaps, hear one of the candidates speak—not many hear more than one—but in the main he forms his opinions by what he reads in the newspapers, including reports of speeches, on the literature supplied to him, and on general report.

It is one of the outstanding merits of P.R. that for the first time it enables the elector to combine a vote given for the support of his party with a vote given on grounds of personal fitness. With single-member areas he is limited to the man the local party caucus have selected. He may not like him. He may even despise him. But he cannot vote against him without voting for the candidate of a party to which he is opposed.

In considering the working of P.R. from the point of view of the candidate it is essential to remember three things. First, in the enlarged constituency it is not necessary to poll a majority of votes. All that is needed is a quota, and the candidate can draw support from a much wider area. Secondly, candidates of the same party do, and must, work together as a team.

The Case Against P.R., Continued

Each of them hopes that if the whole team cannot secure election he will be one of the fortunate ones, just as in a cricket team every batsman may hope that it will fall to him to be top scorer, but the governing consideration in both cases is the success of the team. Thirdly, if I am a voter in a single-member area, let us say the St. Albans division of Hertfordshire, it matters very little to me who the candidates are in the neighbouring divisions of Hertford and Watford, but if Hertfordshire is one constituency and those candidates are competing for my vote, I shall be keenly interested in any information I can get regarding them.

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The Alleged Failure of P.R. in Germany

NEXT after the perennial reference to French instability—the teetotaller held up as an awful example of the evils of drink!—the commonest reproach against P.R. is that it failed to prevent the rise of Hitler. Some go further and suggest that the number of parties to which P.R. gave rise in Germany made settled government impossible and so actually produced the Nazi Revolution. It is essential to test these statements in the light of the facts.

First as to parties. It is a complete delusion to imagine that the numerous parties in Germany were the product of P.R. They existed under the Kaiser. From the foundation of the German Reich in 1871, right down to the commencement of the Great War, there was no general election at which any one party secured a clear majority! In fact, the number of parties actually diminished under P.R. At the general election of 1912, with single-member constituencies and the second ballot, twenty parties obtained representation, and the composition of the Reichstag was as follows:

Social Democrats	110
Centre	91
National Liberals	45
Conservatives	43
Progressive People's Party	42
Poles	18

Alleged Failure of P.R. in Germany

Reich Party	14
Guelphs	5
Reform Party	3
Farmers' Union	3
Christian Social Party	3
Alsace-Lorrainers	3
Alsace-Lorraine Centre Party	3
Economic Union	2
German Social Party	2
German Peasants' League	2
Bavarian Peasants' League	2
Independent Lorrainers	2
Dane	1
Alsatian	1
Others	2

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In 1920, with a larger Reichstag and P.R., only ten parties were represented, and in 1933 six parties secured 633 out of the 647 seats. The fallacy of this kind of criticism lies in supposing that if Germany had had our system of election it would have had no more parties than we have. Germany had our system of election for more than forty years and yet parties multiplied. Dr. Arnold Wolfers, then Director of the School of Politics at Berlin, speaking at Chatham House in November 1932, explained this as due to the wide diversity of interests, ideals, and nationalities included in the Reich. "A country," he said, "which is so divided, which in itself unites such fundamentally different groups, characters, tendencies, and ideals, is certainly least fit for the exclusive rule of one party," and he went on to say that the things which had happened under dictatorship in other countries would be nothing

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to the terrible brutality and terrorism with which such a government in Germany would have to defend its position. Subsequent events have given to this statement the character of a prophecy which has been only too literally fulfilled.

As to proportional representation, the remark which I have made elsewhere applies here also. It is not P.R. which led to the multiplication of parties, but the multiplication of parties which compelled the adoption of P.R.

When one considers that the republic was born in humiliation and defeat, that it had against it all those numerous classes whose prejudices or whose interest lay in the restoration of the monarchy, as well as those discontented elements at the other end of the scale who wished to introduce the Russian model into Germany, that it had to carry the nation through the miseries of devaluation and the French occupation of the Ruhr, the wonder is that it endured so long and accomplished so much. The German historian, Professor Rosenberg, declares that in December 1923 no thoughtful observer would have wagered five shillings on its continuance. The reasons of Hitler's rise to power are written large on the face of history. So long as the mass of Germans hoped to get justice and genuine equality with other nations by constitutional means, by the policy of Stresemann and Brüning, they remained loyal to the republic. But when, on top of the economic misery which they had to suffer as a result of the financial crisis of 1929, they found that no progress at all was being made towards securing disarmament by the victorious Powers,

Alleged Failure of P.R. in Germany

the path was made easy for the man who promised that this state of things should endure no longer, and that, under his leadership, Germany would assert its rights and would refuse to accept a position of humiliating inferiority.

In this time of crisis, the action of the party to which the maintenance of the republic was a matter of life or death helped to smooth Hitler's path. The Social Democrats were the largest party in the Reichstag. Their leader, Herr Müller, was Chancellor, the head of a coalition government. The financial crisis rendered necessary drastic economies and the Social Democratic party did not see its way to accept responsibility for all of these. The Social Democrats withdrew from the government. The succeeding government, that of Brüning, had no majority in the Reichstag and was compelled to have recourse to Presidential decrees. The Reichstag accepted these decrees, the Social Democrats not voting against, but this was not the same as if the Social Democrats were part of the government, accepting full responsibility and providing it with a parliamentary majority. The Social Democrats did not foresee the full consequences of their action any more than the British Labour party foresaw that their action at the time of the financial crisis of 1931 would lead to four years of what was practically unfettered Conservative control in Great Britain—the famous “free hand” given to the government.

In none of the elections prior to his appointment as Chancellor did Hitler secure a majority of the votes. Indeed, his party suffered a setback in the November

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election of 1932; their seats fell from 230 to 196, representing a loss of 2,000,000 votes. Hitler's accession to power in the following January was made possible by a fatal defect in the Weimar Constitution—a defect to which too little attention has been directed—the power vested in the President of dismissing and appointing Ministries without reference to parliament. It was possible for a senile President to dismiss the government of Brüning and to replace him with a government of his own friends, the von Papen Ministry that commanded but a trifling support within the Reichstag. It was this power that enabled the President to confer the chancellorship upon Hitler. Even in the first election under Hitler's regime the Nazis failed to win a majority of the votes or seats, but once Hitler was Chancellor the vast powers possessed by a German government were available for the destruction of the republic.

The leaders of the republic made one other mistake which assisted their downfall. They allowed the Reichwehr to remain under the control of reactionaries who could not be trusted to stand by the republic in its hour of peril. Instead of P.R. having assisted the downfall of the republic, it would be much truer to say that but for P.R. the republic would have perished in its infancy. The Hitler revolution became possible when once the mass of the German people, and in particular the youth of Germany, became convinced that there was no hope of obtaining for Germany equality with the victorious Powers by constitutional means. P.R. did not hasten that revolution. Under a single-member

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system Hitler might easily have risen to power on the crest of a wave of nationalist emotion much earlier than he did. It is worth bearing in mind also that the greatest of Germany's post-war statesmen, Herr Stresemann, was a member of a minority party, and without P.R. would have had no chance whatever of becoming Foreign Minister and doing his great work for the appeasement of Europe.

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P.R. in Western Europe

NINE out of ten people who oppose P.R. do so on the ground, which is taken for granted as if it were an accepted fact, that it would lead to the break-up of parties and so reduce government to impotence. "Under P.R.," they say, "every small group would put up its own candidate. A government could only be formed by a process of haggling between a number of small groups, each of which cared nothing for the general welfare but only for its own particular crotchet. A number of these groups would combine to support each other's nostrums in return for support for their own on the principle of—'You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours.' A government so formed would lack any real principle of cohesion and would fall to pieces in a few months, as governments do in France, to be succeeded by another equally unstable."

That some such alarming picture really is conjured up in many minds by the mention of P.R., the columns of the daily and weekly Press give ample evidence. Where does it come from? How does it arise? There is no evidence for it. No one can point to any country or group of countries and say: "This is what has happened there as a result of P.R.; therefore it is likely to happen with us." Indeed, the country which is now commonly cited as an example of the awful effects P.R.

P.R. in Western Europe

may produce, is one which has never had a proportional system of election, namely, France. Least of all can anyone say that the single transferable vote, which is what we in Great Britain mean by P.R., has produced either weak government or the multiplication of parties. After fifteen years of P.R. the Irish Free State has fewer parties than when the State was founded. In the 1933 election there were four parties, but as Labour was in close alliance with Fianna Fail, while the Farmers' or Centre party was giving general support to Mr. Cosgrave, the election came nearer to being a two-party election than any which has been seen in Great Britain since the war. In 1937 there were three parties, Fianna Fail, Fine Gael, and Labour. In Tasmania, with thirty years' experience of P.R., there are only two parties, Labour and Nationalist. Take again the test of strong government. No democracy in Europe has had stronger or more stable governments than the Irish Free State.

Critics who assert that P.R. has failed on the Continent are usually thinking either of a country which they erroneously imagine to conduct its elections by that method, or of a country which adopted P.R. after the war and retained it so long as it remained a democracy at all. Little or no attention is paid to the flourishing group of countries, situated mainly along the north-western seaboard of Europe, which have conducted their elections by P.R. ever since the war, if not longer, and are still doing so. I refer to Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, and Czechoslovakia. These are not backward countries. They are among the most progressive in

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Europe. If they found that proportional representation was working badly and producing those evils which theorists over here attribute to it, why have they not discarded it? It is a significant fact that no country in Europe which has once adopted P.R. has ever abandoned it except those countries which have fallen under the grip of a dictator.

If any reference is made to these smaller countries, it is not to suggest that they are badly governed, or that their governments are corrupt, or that they have frequent changes of Ministry—none of these things is true—but to point out that they have more than two parties; in most cases four, in some considerably more. If the facts are examined a little more deeply it will be found that it is not P.R. which has created the parties, but the parties which have compelled the adoption of P.R. Nowhere on the Continent does a two-party system prevail. The habits of mind of Continental peoples do not lend themselves to it. Indeed, it may be questioned whether there is any country in the world, not even the United States of America, where a genuine two-party system prevails, with the exception of the Australian state of Tasmania. The problems of democracy are too numerous and too complex for people to be divided into two mutually exclusive groups. Any such grouping is necessarily artificial and due to an over-development of party organizations.

Now, with only two candidates competing, the defects of the "first-past-the-post" system of election, which prevails with us, are not so obvious as with three or

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four. They can only be seen by looking at results over a larger area than an isolated constituency. We have had some experience in Great Britain, especially at by-elections, of four or five candidates contesting one single-member constituency. We know from experience that the result is a violent gamble. How much worse is it when at a general election there are three or four candidates, and sometimes more, fighting almost every seat in the country. That is the position in countries with numerous parties where the single-member system prevails. The result has been to produce such discontent that they have been driven to look for some fairer method. They have found it in P.R. In a country with four or more parties it is only by conducting elections under P.R. that government can be carried on without a constant succession of crises. But the presence of numerous parties is by no means the only cause which has led to the adoption of P.R. Wherever the gamble of the polls has led to the complete or partial suppression of one of the major parties in the State, then, provided that political and party feelings have been inflamed beyond what may be called by way of analogy the Plimsoll line, there is produced a condition of tension dangerous to the stability of the State.

A brief survey of the recent history of the countries under review will serve to bear out the foregoing observations.

BELGIUM

Belgium adopted P.R. in 1899, after a disastrous experience of the second ballot, as the only means of

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avoiding a serious outbreak of violence. Count Goblet d'Alviella, who was Vice-President of the Senate before the war, recounting the events of that period, says:

"In 1899 Belgium was on the eve of a revolution—a revolution which was only avoided by the immediate and complete introduction of proportional representation into Parliamentary elections."

The second ballot had produced, as it always does, combinations springing not from similarity of political principle but from mere spite. At one election there was bitter feeling between Liberals and Socialists, as there was in England after the election of 1929. In consequence, at the second ballot both parties gave their votes to the Catholic candidates, and in one province the Catholic party absolutely swept the board and neither Liberals nor Socialists secured a seat at all. At another election the combination was different and the Catholics were unduly depressed.

Proportional representation has proved its value over a period of thirty-seven years, and has been made part of the permanent constitution of the country. It has enabled the Government to be carried on with at least as much stability as in Great Britain. Indeed, Professor Speyer, of the University of Brussels, writing during the Conservative Ministry of 1924-29, claimed that Belgium had done better than Great Britain, and pointed out that during the period of six years, from 1918 to 1924, we had had four general elections. It has not led to the break-up of parties. Through practically the whole thirty-seven years three main parties

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have formed more than 95 per cent of the legislature, the remainder being made up (since 1919) of Flemish Nationalists and one or two Communists. To quote again from Professor Speyer:

"What leads to weakness is the number of groups, and this P.R. in Belgium has not produced. On the other hand, it has the incalculable advantage of allowing the different political tendencies to assert themselves in proportion to their real strength, while the majority regime leads necessarily to second ballots with their unwholesome bargains, or the relative majority system which, by a complete perversion of representative government, gives a majority of seats to a minority of the electors. P.R. has besides the incontestable advantage of political justice and appeasement."

The testimony of Mr. R. C. Ensor in an article in *Everyman* is to the same effect. "P.R.," he says, "did not encourage the growth of inconsiderable parties; on the contrary it soon squeezed out some which were then showing their heads."

For fifteen years up to the war the Catholics had a clear majority over all other parties, and were able to form a purely Catholic Ministry. Since the war, following the adoption of universal manhood suffrage, parties have been more evenly divided. Nevertheless, no great difficulty has been experienced in forming representative and stable governments. The one great crisis in Belgian parliamentary history occurred in 1925. The Catholic and Socialist parties were exactly equal with seventy-eight members each; the Liberals held the

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balance with twenty-two. Attempts to form a one-party government naturally broke down. A Liberal statesman, the famous burgomaster Max, was commissioned to try to form a business government, but this attempt also failed. Finally, Monsieur Vandervelde, the leader of the Socialists, asked the permission of his party to join with democrats of other parties in forming a government on the basis of the common elements in their respective programmes. They agreed, and the democratic wing of the Catholic party also fell in with the arrangement. By a combination of these two a government was formed having a genuine majority, which stabilized the franc, restored the finances of the country, and accomplished at least as much as, and probably more than, any one-party government could have done.

In 1936 a wave of Nationalism and Fascism swept over Europe, and the 1936 election witnessed the emergence of the Rexist party (an offshoot of the Catholics) and a great increase in the strength of the Flemish Nationalists. The new Legislature was composed of six parties as under:

Socialists	70
Catholics	63
Liberals	23
Rexist	21
Flemish Nationalists	16
Communists	9

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The three main parties again combined to form a Ministry of a national type. The extent of the success of the Rexist was unexpected, but it seems likely that

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in due course they will be re-absorbed, as other parties, whose formation was due to temporary causes, have been before them.

HOLLAND

Holland is the one country now electing its parliament by proportional representation which is cited with any frequency as a proof that the system works badly. The basis of fact underlying this is that there are a number of parties in Holland. It is assumed, first, that this must be due to P.R., and, second, that it must be inconsistent with stable government, even though ministerial crises have not, in fact, been specially numerous in Holland, nor has any greater difficulty been experienced in forming or carrying on the government than elsewhere.

Two features of the Dutch electoral system in its original form were specially favourable to small parties. (1) No deposit was required from candidates; and (2) parties could pool together the votes gained in each of the eighteen constituencies into which the country is divided. Under the electoral law as amended in 1935, each list nominated has to pay a deposit. Further, while parties can still pool their votes over the whole country, the minimum which entitles a party to representation has been increased. There used to be in Holland a great discrepancy between the number of parties which put forward lists of candidates and the number actually represented in the Chamber. Many organizations, and even individuals, regarded a general election as an opportunity to advertise themselves by

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nominating candidates without any real expectation, or possibly even wish, that they should be elected. The electors for the most part ignored them and concentrated on the parties which were really national. In considering the problem of government, parties of the kind mentioned are irrelevant. It is immaterial that forty or fifty parties, so called, may have put forward a list of one or more candidates if only six or seven of them figure in parliament.

P.R. has made little difference to the number of parties obtaining representation in the legislature. Previous to its adoption elections were held under the single-member system with a second ballot. The last general election under this system was in 1913 and resulted in a Chamber consisting of seven parties and one independent. Sixteen years later, six of the same seven parties accounted for 92 seats out of 100. In 1937 they held 89 seats out of 100, or, with two wing parties of two each, 93 seats. The remaining seven seats represent political tendencies which few countries in Europe have escaped: Communism with three seats, and the reaction to Communism, Fascism, with four seats.

Here, as elsewhere, P.R. has not produced a multiplicity of parties in the legislature; a multiplicity of parties has compelled the adoption of P.R.

DENMARK, NORWAY, SWEDEN, FINLAND

It is unnecessary to devote much space to the Scandinavian countries. They are admittedly among the

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best educated and most enlightened in Europe. They have all adopted proportional representation because they have tried other methods and found them unsatisfactory; they have retained it because it has proved its value. Three of them have four main parties, all of which antedate P.R.; Finland has one more.

P.R. was introduced in Denmark in 1908 for municipal elections and in 1915 for the election of the Lower House of the Rigsdag. The system adopted for parliamentary elections preserved the single-member constituencies outside the capital, and gave additional seats so as to arrive at proportional representation. This system did not give satisfaction, in particular to the Socialists who found that, in order to get to the head of the poll in a reasonable number of single-member areas, they had to bargain with the Radicals for mutual support. Discussion on an amending bill was in progress in 1920 when a political storm arose over Schleswig and precipitated a general election. When it appeared that the election would be held under the 1915 law, the Socialists proclaimed a general strike, and the amending P.R. bill was hurried through by agreement before the election took place. The 1920 law secures fair representation under free conditions, whilst still maintaining a certain association of the elected members with the old single-member constituencies.

Two quotations from independent sources relative to the working of P.R. in Sweden are of special interest. The first is from a special article in *The Times*, dated August 6, 1931. After commenting on the fact

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that the Liberal Party, which was then in office, was out-numbered to the extent of more than two to one both by the Conservatives and the Socialists, the article continues :

“But if the truth be told, Parliament seems to perform the duties required of it with so little friction and fuss that changes in the government or the alignment of parties are matters of no great concern to the rest of the community. Private members have a much greater influence over the administration of the country than can ever be acquired by British back-benchers. The Rigsdag is able to do most of its work in a departmental atmosphere.”

Since 1931 there has been a big swing to the Left and Mr. Oliver Baldwin (now Viscount Corvedale), the late Prime Minister's Socialist son, commented on the 1936 election as follows :

“Sweden's Socialist party has scored an electoral triumph and will once again take over the government of that happy country.

“It is little realized in Great Britain how well the Socialist governments of Sweden, Denmark and Norway have done in social legislation . . .

“The victory in Sweden does not tally with the British Labour Party's oft-repeated assertion that a victory for Socialism under proportional representation is an impossibility, for there under P.R. the Socialist total vote increased by 195,665 and ten seats were gained.”

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SWITZERLAND

Switzerland is notable for having, under P.R., the most stable government in Europe. For a country which is homogeneous neither in race, in language, nor in religion, this is a remarkable achievement. Notable also is the fact that, as in the case of Belgium, P.R. was first introduced as the only means of averting a revolution due to the unsatisfactory working of the older system. In the canton of Ticino in the year 1889, the Conservatives with 12,783 votes secured 77 deputies. The Liberals with 12,166 got only 35; that is to say, that with an almost equal vote the Liberals got less than half the representation of their opponents. They alleged that the constituencies had been gerrymandered to produce this result. A revolution broke out at Bellinzona to enforce a demand for the revision of the Constitution. A representative of the Federal Council was sent to the spot to investigate and advised the adoption of P.R., to which the parties agreed, and it was adopted in the following year. By degrees other cantons followed the example of Ticino, and finally, in 1919, the system was adopted for federal elections.

The Swiss have evolved a system of government which is without parallel elsewhere. There are four main parties—Socialists, Radicals, Catholics, and Peasants. The Federal Executive consists of seven members chosen by both houses of the legislature so as to be representative of various races and interests. Each member is the head of a department. The principle of joint responsibility is not rigorously applied.

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If a government measure is defeated, the government accepts the will of the Chamber and modifies its policy accordingly. The particular Minister responsible may or may not resign, but the government carries on. There is no such thing as a ministerial crisis. The result has been, as Professor Robert C. Brooks says in his *Government and Politics in Switzerland*, the creation of a separate, permanent, and powerful executive. The system would not suit Great Britain, but it may well prove more suitable for countries with a less deeply rooted parliamentary tradition. That at least is the view of Lord Howard of Penrith, who, in a letter to the *Daily Telegraph* of October 19, 1936, says:

"The great misfortune, in my opinion, of almost all European democratic constitutions has been that they have followed the British example of government by a bare majority, which is required for any and every measure of vital importance. This for stability necessitates what is virtually a two-party system, and the two-party system is uncongenial to the habit of mind of almost every nation but the Anglo-Saxons. The others, for reasons which I cannot go into here, almost invariably tend to split up into more parties. . . . It were well if constitutional and democratic government could in future rather follow the Swiss example than that of our own country."

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Czechoslovakia is one of the Succession States and has never known any other system of election than P.R., which was adopted from the outset under its famous

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President, Masaryk. In a country where racial and other divisions are so numerous and so intense it is inevitable that there should be a good many parties. At the last general election in 1935 nine Czechoslovakian and five German and Magyar parties obtained representation in a House of 320 members. Four of these parties, however, had only twenty-six members between them. The Czech parties were in a large majority and the government was formed, as previously, mainly from a combination of these parties, which naturally have much in common, but representatives both of Germans and Slovaks were included in the Ministry. It is very doubtful whether the system of election has had any appreciable effect on the number of parties, which are fully accounted for by local, cultural, and racial divisions. But, however that may be, no one can assert that Czechoslovakia has been badly governed, or that its government has lacked either strength or stability. It is the outpost of democracy in Central Europe, and under its two great Presidents, Doctor Masaryk and Doctor Beneš, has been the most peaceful and the best governed of any State in Central Europe.

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P.R. in Northern Ireland

IRELAND is at once the test case of the application of P.R. and the standing refutation of all those charges which are commonly brought against it. It was introduced into the original constitution of both Northern and Southern Ireland for the same purpose, namely, to prevent the oppression of minorities. The Irish Free State has retained it. The government of Northern Ireland abolished it for local elections in 1922, and for parliamentary elections in 1929. The contrast is instructive. In Southern Ireland the religious question has ceased to be the dividing line in politics. The division of parties is on quite other lines. The religious issue, which used to be as bitter in the south of Ireland as in the north, has ceased to be a feature in politics. There is no longer a Protestant party and a Catholic party.

Far otherwise is it in Ulster. P.R. was carrying out its beneficent work of appeasement there also. Catholics and Nationalists (the two are usually identical) were in a minority, but were fairly represented and had no sense of grievance. Catholics had some representation even in areas predominantly Protestant, and vice versa. The abolition of P.R. was followed by an outbreak of bitterness which is still in full force to-day. Not only did the Nationalists resent the abolition, but they

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believe, and they have some ground for their belief, that the new constituencies have been gerrymandered so as to secure Unionist predominance. Anyone who looks at the constituency of South Fermanagh on the map must wonder what influences have been at work to produce so strange a monstrosity. A typical expression of Nationalist feeling is contained in an article in the *Irish Press* by Mr. Cahir Healy on November 28, 1934. After giving a long list of cases in which Nationalists are under-represented, culminating in Fermanagh where 25,000 Unionists get two members and 32,000 Nationalists one, he says :

“In order to attain these results, parliamentary constituencies have been formed which present truly marvellous contours on the map. They fling out here and there like the claws of a crab. If a map of the Six Counties could be given it would indicate the difficulties which Lord Craigavon’s constituency manipulators must have experienced in their task of making the Six Counties safe from democracy.”

The belief that the boundaries of the new constituencies were intentionally manipulated is universally held by Nationalists in the Six Counties, but even if that suspicion is unfounded, a sense of injustice remains, and the single-member system acts as a constant irritant, preventing the healing of religious and racial animosities.

As to the motives which prompted the abolition, Viscount Craigavon has made inconsistent statements at different times, but probably the ruling motive was

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the desire to suppress the independent Unionist member who had the temerity to differ from the Government on temperance and other questions, and at the same time to deprive the Labour party of representation. "There is no room," said Viscount Craigavon, speaking in 1928 at the 238th anniversary of the Battle of the Boyne, "I say most solemnly, there is no room for a third party in Ulster politics. We live on too narrow a majority." Actually the majority was not narrow. In a House of Commons of only fifty-two members, the Government had in its first P.R. parliament a majority of twenty-eight, and in its second of either fourteen or twenty-four, according as the independent Unionists are reckoned among the opponents or the supporters of the Government. (There were two Republicans elected to this parliament, but as they never took their seats they need not be considered.)

On December 8, 1927, in a debate on a vote of censure in the Northern Ireland House of Commons, he gave another reason, and one which has afforded a weapon to his opponents. He said that he was abolishing P.R. in order to preserve the imperial connection, and explained this by saying that "owing to the complexities of the P.R. system there might be returned more members to the Opposition side than to the Government side." From that day to this it has been the constant claim and the fixed belief of Ulster Nationalists that P.R. was abolished in order to maintain and perpetuate Unionist ascendancy, or, in the words of Mr. Cahir Healy's bitter gibe, "to make the Six Counties safe from democracy." Dr. Mansergh,

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in his book, *The Government of Northern Ireland*, is undoubtedly right in saying that the abolition of proportional representation, first in local elections and later in parliamentary elections, has aroused more feeling than any other action of the Government.

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P.R. in the Irish Free State

IT is significant that no one ever thinks of drawing an argument against P.R. from the experience of the British Empire. They fall back on Continental countries whose history and traditions are widely dissimilar and where the method of applying P.R. is imperfect and inferior. Yet empire experience furnishes an answer to all the questions most frequently raised. Is P.R. inconsistent with a two-party system? The experience of Tasmania proves that it is not. Tasmania adopted P.R. thirty years ago. Almost alone of Australian states it has only two parties, Labour and Nationalist, and government has gone on so smoothly that we never hear of it. Usually the two parties have been fairly evenly balanced and majorities have been small one way or the other, but the smallness of its majority has never prevented government from functioning. In 1937 there was a strong movement to the left in the electorate. The result of the poll faithfully recorded this change of opinion, and the new legislature consisted of eighteen Labour members to twelve Nationalists.

The best test of how the British system of P.R. works is the Irish Free State, which has had it since its formation. Tasmanian experience is often discounted—unfairly, I think—on the ground that it is only one state in a Federal Commonwealth. But Southern

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Ireland is, in fact if not in theory, an independent sovereign state. Moreover the system was introduced under circumstances which might have wrecked any government. The country was full of bitter antagonisms, Unionist and Nationalist, supporters of the Treaty and its opponents, and beyond these a division between Mr. de Valera and still more fanatical and irreconcilable Republicans. Hardly had the Government been formed when it was faced with a civil war, waged with the same ferocity which had previously been directed against the British Government. An article in the *Round Table*, written in the first year of the Free State's existence, gives a vivid contemporary picture of the conditions under which the Government functioned :

"Every Minister knows that his death-warrant has been signed ; that, given the slightest opportunity, he will be shot like a dog, indeed with much less compunction than we would shoot a dog. Every Minister is compelled to live permanently in the government offices, unless to drive under heavy escort to some equally well-guarded post. He is cut off from the ordinary amenities of life. Even his family is not safe."

After ten years of Mr. Cosgrave's government Ireland had become as safe as Great Britain, and Sir Charles Petrie, in an article on "Ireland Revisited" in the *Saturday Review* of August 15, 1931, declared that Mr. Cosgrave and his colleagues had achieved what had seemed impossible. He bore testimony to the improvement of the roads and the reorganization and efficiency of the police, and summed up by saying that "at long

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last Ireland has a government that knows its own mind"—not the feeble and vacillating government conjured up by the imagination of political theorists, but "a government that knows its own mind."

All honour to the men who at peril of their lives accomplished this astounding transformation! But let due credit be given also to the system of election which alone made it possible. Even if P.R. were only machinery, it is still true that in order to convert natural forces into creative power the right machinery is essential. But P.R. is much more than machinery; it sets free for the service of the State forces that without it can find no outlet.

Without P.R. the government of Michael Collins, which on his assassination in August 1922 became Mr. Cosgrave's government, could not have been formed at all. Instead there would have been a government divided against itself, which could never have attempted to tackle armed rebellion and lawlessness, with which nearly half its members would have been in sympathy.

When the convention parliament came to be elected in 1922 to ratify the Irish Treaty, the supporters of Michael Collins and the supporters of de Valera in the existing House of Commons of Southern Ireland (elected under the Government of Ireland Act of 1920) were very nearly equal, and the majority in favour of the Treaty was a narrow one. Both parties were afraid of what an election might produce and agreed not to put up candidates against each other, but to stabilize the representation of each at what it was in the convention. With single-member constituencies that pact

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would have been carried through with disastrous results. It would have been hopeless for anyone to stand against the combined forces of the two main parties. As a result, no one would have known what the real mind of Ireland was, and the forces of those who were prepared to carry opposition to the Treaty to the extent of civil war would have been immensely strengthened. Under proportional representation the appearance of any independent candidate necessitated a poll of the whole constituency, and in by far the greatest part of the twenty-eight constituencies into which the Free State was divided such candidates did come forward. The poll gave the electors a chance of showing by their preferences whether they were for the Treaty or against it; whether on this vital issue they stood behind Mr. Collins or Mr. de Valera. The result was an overwhelming victory for the Treaty, which enabled Mr. Collins and, after his assassination, Mr. Cosgrave, to go forward confidently to the pacification of Ireland. In contested county and borough areas pro-Treaty candidates won sixty-eight seats and anti-Treaty candidates only eighteen; in Southern Ireland as a whole the result was pro-Treaty ninety-two, anti-Treaty thirty-six.

Had moderate opinion had such a chance of expressing itself in Great Britain in 1918, how different the subsequent story would have been! It is not too much to say that the whole course of post-war history would have been different. Indeed, the operation of the single-member system in the election of 1918 had almost as unfortunate an effect on the history of Ireland

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as on that of Great Britain, though for an entirely different reason. In Great Britain it gave a wholly unreal ascendancy to the "Hang the Kaiser" school, to the people who thought only of making Germany pay to the uttermost and gave no thought to the future. In Ireland the same system led to the almost complete extinction—in Parliament—of the old Nationalist Party to whose efforts the passing of the Home Rule Bill of 1914 had been due, in favour of the new extreme Sinn Fein Party, the heirs of the 1916 rebellion. If the election results had told the truth, the Nationalist Party was by no means extinct. Rather less than half the electorate had voted Sinn Fein, rather more than one-quarter had voted Unionist, and rather less than one-quarter had voted Nationalist. Sinn Fein should have won thirty-seven seats, the Nationalists seventeen. But a party which cannot get representation is powerless. The fact which struck the public imagination, and was the governing factor in the negotiations for the treaty of 1921, was that the Nationalist Party had been reduced to six members, when Sinn Fein had seventy-three.

Every one of the charges so freely levelled against P.R. by opponents in this country is rebutted by the experience of the Irish Free State. It has not produced a weak executive. On the contrary, both under Mr. Cosgrave and Mr. de Valera, it has produced governments of remarkable strength. It has not led to frequent changes of government. Mr. Cosgrave had ten years of power. Mr. de Valera has already won three elections, in two of which he had a clear majority over all other

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parties, while in the third his party was not only by far the largest in votes but was equal in seats to the combined total of the other two (one of which was in general alliance with him) with the eight independent members thrown in. Since his accession to office he has carried through without serious difficulty a series of most revolutionary changes. Nor has P.R. led to the multiplication of parties. Dr. W. G. S. Adams, who is not exactly a supporter of P.R., testifies in a preface to Dr. Mansergh's recent book, *The Irish Free State: Its Government and Politics*, that "proportional representation in the Free State has not produced the multiplicity of groups which has been its bane in some other countries."

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P.R. in Local Elections

BOTH the principle and the method of proportional representation are as applicable to local elections as they are to parliamentary elections. Indeed, P.R. has been used for purposes as diverse as the election of the committee of a Legislative Council and of the executive of a Co-operative Society. It is the method by which all local bodies are elected in the Irish Free State. It was in use in Scotland for the election of the *ad hoc* county education authorities from 1919 until the educational services were placed under the direct control of the county councils in the year 1929. It has not so far been used for local elections in England and Wales.

There are considerable differences in the methods of constituting local authorities. The election may be either annual or triennial; the area administered by the authority may or may not be divided into wards or other subdivisions for electoral purposes; and the number of members elected for each unit of representation may vary from one to (in the case of a parish council) fifteen. Where elections are triennial, the whole of the authority is elected at the same time. This is the case with county councils, including the London County Council, London borough councils, and some urban and rural district councils. Where elections are

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annual, as in the case of town councils in the provinces and some urban and rural district councils, it usually means that the area administered by the authority is divided into wards returning three (occasionally six) members each, and that one-third of the members of each ward retire every year. In the parish, the entire council is elected every third year.

In all cases where more than one member is elected at the same time for the same area the method of election is the block vote. If five members are to be elected, each elector votes for five candidates. Unless where the choice is a purely personal one, it would be difficult to devise a worse method of election than this. Whenever the election proceeds on political lines, as is increasingly the case, a one per cent majority can elect the whole body of representatives. Not only does this method of election produce results which are wholly unrepresentative, but it seriously weakens the personnel of the councils. The ablest candidates of the weaker party are excluded; the weakest candidates of the majority party get in almost automatically. A small change in the balance of opinion may lead to an almost complete change of personnel between the new council and the old, so that you get a council in which the element of administrative experience is largely lacking. These things are true of the single-member election as well; the block vote merely accentuates the evil. A town councillor with fifteen years' disinterested service to his credit may be turned out (it has happened) because, acting for the good of the town, he has offended some powerful interest in his own ward.

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The London county and borough councils furnish glaring examples of these evils. Huge areas with mixed political populations are represented exclusively by one party. In a large area of East London, partly north and partly south of the Thames, the figures for the 1934 London County Council election showed :

<i>Party</i>	<i>Votes</i>	<i>Seats</i>
Labour	395,654	54
Municipal Reform	198,991	0
Liberal	30,697	0

Putting the figures in round numbers, Labour with less than 400,000 votes got 54 seats, Municipal Reform with nearly 200,000 got none. Liberals contested very few seats, but two of the most valuable members of the council, Sir Percy Harris and Mr. F. Briant, were squeezed out.

In 1937 the results for the same area were very similar. In an area made up of twenty-five adjoining constituencies every single councillor was Labour :

<i>Party</i>	<i>Votes</i>	<i>Seats</i>
Labour	424,548	50
Municipal Reform	215,920	0

There are other areas in West and South London where Labour has no chance at all.

The same thing happens in borough council elections. In the 1934 election* every single councillor in the boroughs of Westminster, Chelsea, Hampstead, and

* In the 1937 election there were seven councils in which the elected councillors were all of one party, and in several other councils the minority obtained a representation too meagre to enable it adequately to play its part in the work of the council.—A. J. G.

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Holborn belonged to the Municipal Reform Party, while in Bermondsey, Bethnal Green, Poplar, and Stepney every councillor, and in Southwark fifty-nine councillors out of sixty, were Labour. The matter is made worse where the majority takes advantage of its position to elect aldermen exclusively of its own colour.

Results of this kind not only encourage extremism on the part of the dominant majority and leave a bitter sense of injustice in the minds of the unrepresented minority, but they produce an apparent contrast between areas of solid Labour and areas of solid Conservatism which does not, in fact, exist. Class antagonisms, instead of being healed, are intensified.

As in parliamentary elections, it is also possible for a minority of the voters to elect a majority of the council. In Glasgow in 1933, Labour, with 98,000 votes out of 310,000, secured 21 out of 35 contested seats.

To substitute P.R. for the present haphazard methods is a perfectly simple matter. Where one-third of the members of each ward are elected annually, all that is needed is to hold the elections every three years and elect all the members together. A great deal of unnecessary expense will be saved and the very fact of the election being by P.R. will ensure a measure of continuity between one council and its successor. Wherever the block vote is in operation nothing more is needed than to substitute for it the single transferable vote. Where, as in the case of county councils, single-member areas have been constituted, the same process of grouping will be carried out which has been already described in Chapter 5.

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Another unsatisfactory accompaniment of the present system is the formation of open or tacit pacts between Conservative and Liberal to "keep out Labour." Whether they succeed or fail—in many cases they have been only too successful—the result is injustice and a poisoning of that atmosphere of goodwill in which local administration ought to be carried on. Incidentally, the Liberal Party has often paid heavily for these pacts in loss of votes in parliamentary contests. They have given occasion for the gibe that there is no difference between Conservative and Liberal!

When it is considered that none of the objections commonly urged against P.R. apply to local government at all, it is surprising that there has not been a more insistent demand for its application. Bills for this purpose have from time to time been introduced in the House of Commons, but have suffered the usual fate of private members' bills for which government gives no facilities. Similar bills have on four occasions passed the House of Lords but have got no further.

Far otherwise has it been in the United States. With us the extraordinarily freakish results of a series of general elections, the disastrous effect of the "coupon" election of 1918 on the settlement of Europe, and the almost complete suppression of the expression of Liberal opinion in Parliament, have forced the question of parliamentary elections to the front. In America it has been exactly the opposite. The demand for reform has focused itself entirely on municipal administration. For this there are probably two reasons. First, Americans tolerate in their presidential and other elections

P.R. in Local Elections

anomalies many of which could be removed only by a constitutional amendment. Second, the administration of many American cities has been so appalling that honest citizens have been driven to look for some way of defeating the corrupt and dangerous oligarchies which have hitherto controlled the elections. Citizens' Unions and other similar bodies have been formed, and the standard plan has been evolved of a "city manager" controlled by a council elected by P.R.

The first towns to experiment with this plan were comparatively unimportant, but in 1921 it was adopted on a referendum by Cleveland, Ohio (population 900,000), the fifth city in the United States; and the first P.R. election was held in 1923. In the following year Cincinnati (population 450,000) followed suit. In both cases the change was made in the face of bitter opposition from the political organizations which had hitherto controlled the elections, but in both cases the results were immediate. Cincinnati saved a million and Cleveland half a million dollars in the first year of the new regime. Commenting on this the *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, which had opposed the introduction of P.R. in the first instance, said in a leading article:

"While such a saving is important, most citizens will agree that a far higher compliment is to be found in the quality of constructive work done during the twelve months. Cleveland needed no manager's report to realize how much better the parks have been cared for, how street improvements have been pushed, old highways extended or widened, and new ones projected; how the city has co-operated with its neighbours in

The Case for Electoral Reform

metropolitan planning; how water-works and light plant extensions have been carried; how the development of mall and lake front has received the constant attention of the city hall."

The political bosses were not content to relinquish the spoils after one fight, and repeated attempts were made at subsequent elections to secure the repeal of P.R. In Cincinnati they have been unsuccessful, but Cleveland in 1931 reverted to the old system. Four years later the Citizens' League of Cleveland published a detailed statement with figures, contrasting the government of the two cities. While Cincinnati had reduced its debt by over ten million dollars in the four years, Cleveland's public debt had increased in the same time by almost the same amount. In Cleveland municipal appointments were made as the reward of political services; in Cincinnati they were made as the result of an impartial civil service examination. As regards the part played by P.R. in the revolution, for it is no less, which has changed Cincinnati from being one of the worst-governed cities in the Union to one of the best, Mr. Charles P. Taft, the son of President Taft, says in *City Management: The Cincinnati Experiment*:

"In 1924 I thought proportional representation a harmless element in the new charter for Cincinnati. There is hardly a supporter of the City Charter Committee to-day who does not feel that proportional representation is the most important single element in the success of good government in the city, and must be preserved at all costs."

P.R. in Local Elections

The P.R. movement took a still more important step forward when on November 3, 1936, the citizens of New York City, the very centre and home of Tammany, decided on a referendum, by 923,186 votes to 555,217, to adopt P.R. for the election of their city council. The result came as a surprise, for most people had believed that the Democratic organization, which of course resisted the change, was too strong to be overthrown. The new charter providing for elections by proportional representation emerged successfully from the ordeal which has so often been fatal to American reformers, an action in the Supreme Court (in this case the Supreme Court of the State). A motion to have the P.R. provisions of the new city charter declared unconstitutional was rejected by that court by a majority of six judges to one. The greatest city in the United States, and the greatest single municipal area in the world, was thus assured of the opportunity to secure for the first time a council truly representative and not amenable to pressure from any outside organization.*

The experience of the United States, limited though it is, has shown conclusively, not only that P.R. can be applied successfully to local elections, but that it has uniformly resulted in better administration and in the election of councillors of a much higher calibre than were available under the old regime.

* In the old Board of Aldermen of New York City, elected from single-member wards, Tammany held 62 out of 65 seats. This practical monopoly has been broken down. In the new council of 26 members elected by P.R., Tammany won 13 seats. The remainder comprise Republicans, Labour (for the first time), and Independents, and the council as a whole is markedly superior in its personnel—A. J. G.

The Case for Electoral Reform

FORM OF FRONT OF BALLOT PAPER

(From the Irish Free State *Electoral Act, 1923*)

<i>Mark Order of Preference in space below</i>	<i>NAMES OF CANDIDATES</i>
	DOYLE (James Doyle, of 10 High Street, Oilman)
	LYNCH (Jane Ellen Lynch, of 12 Main Street, Grocer)
	O'BRIEN (John O'Brien, of 22 Wellclose Place, Accountant)
	O'CONNOR (Charles O'Connor, of 7 Green Street, Gentleman)
	THOMPSON (William Henry Thompson, of 14 Queen Street, Silversmith)
	WILSON (Robert Wilson, of 22 Ranelagh Square, Chemist)

Extract from FORM OF DIRECTIONS for the guidance of the voter in voting.

The voter will go into one of the compartments, and, with the pencil provided there, mark his ballot paper by placing the figure 1 opposite the name of the candidate for whom he votes. He may also place the figures 2, 3, and so on, in accordance with the order of his choice or preference opposite the names of other candidates.

Appendix I

P.R. REDISTRIBUTION SCHEME FOR GREAT BRITAIN

ADOPTED by the House of Lords in January 1918 as an amendment to the Representation of the People Bill, with slight modifications following the recommendations of the Royal Commission which prepared a scheme for applying P.R. to some 100 seats for the House of Commons, April 1918.

NOTE.—The expression “parliamentary division” means “parliamentary division as defined in the Ninth Schedule to the Representation of the People Act, 1918.”

1. LONDON

<i>Name of Constituency</i>	<i>Contents of Constituency</i>	<i>Number of Members</i>
BATTERSEA	The metropolitan borough of Battersea	2
BERMONDSEY AND SOUTHWARK	The metropolitan boroughs of Bermondsey and Southwark	5
BETHNAL GREEN AND SHOREDITCH	The metropolitan boroughs of Bethnal Green and Shoreditch	3
CAMBERWELL	The metropolitan borough of Camberwell	4
CHELSEA AND KENNINGTON	The metropolitan boroughs of Chelsea and Kensington	3
CITY OF LONDON	The City of London	2
DEPTFORD AND LEWISHAM	The metropolitan boroughs of Deptford and Lewisham	3
FINSBURY AND HOLBORN	The metropolitan boroughs of Finsbury and Holborn	2

The Case for Electoral Reform

1. LONDON—(continued)

<i>Name of Constituency</i>	<i>Contents of Constituency</i>	<i>Number of Members</i>
FULHAM AND HAMMERSMITH	The metropolitan boroughs of Fulham and Hammersmith	4
GREENWICH AND WOOLWICH	The metropolitan boroughs of Greenwich and Woolwich	3
HACKNEY AND STOKE NEWINGTON	The metropolitan boroughs of Hackney and Stoke Newington	4
HAMPSTEAD AND ST. PANCRAS	The metropolitan boroughs of Hampstead and St. Pancras	4
ISLINGTON	The metropolitan borough of Islington	4
LAMBETH	The metropolitan borough of Lambeth	4
PADDINGTON AND ST. MARYLEBONE	The metropolitan boroughs of Paddington and St. Marylebone	3
TOWER HAMLETS	The metropolitan boroughs of Poplar and Stepney	5
WANDSWORTH	The metropolitan borough of Wandsworth	5
WESTMINSTER	The metropolitan borough of Westminster	2

2. ENGLAND, excluding London and Monmouthshire—Borough Constituencies

BIRKENHEAD AND WALLASEY	The county boroughs	3
BIRMINGHAM:		
North	The parliamentary divisions of Handsworth, Erdington, Aston, and Duddeston	4
West	The parliamentary divisions of Ladywood, Edgbaston, King's Norton, and West Birmingham	4
East	The parliamentary divisions of Deritend, Moseley, Sparkbrook, and Yardley	4
BRADFORD	The county borough	4
BRISTOL	The county borough	5
DEWBURY, BATLEY, AND WAKEFIELD	The parliamentary divisions of Dewsbury, Batley and Morley, and Wakefield	3
KINGSTON-UPON-HULL	The county borough	4
LEEDS	The county borough	6
LEICESTER	The county borough	3

Appendix I

2. ENGLAND, excluding London and Monmouthshire—Borough Constituencies (*continued*)

<i>Name of Constituency</i>	<i>Contents of Constituency</i>	<i>Number of Members</i>
LIVERPOOL:		
North	The parliamentary divisions of Everton, Kirkdale, Walton, and West Derby.	4
South	The parliamentary divisions of East Toxteth, Edgehill, Fairfield, and Wavertree	4
West	The parliamentary divisions of Scotland, Exchange, and West Toxteth	3
MANCHESTER:		
North-East	The parliamentary divisions of Blackley, Platting, Clayton, Ardwick, and Gorton	5
South-West	The parliamentary divisions of Exchange, Hulme, Moss Side, Rusholme, and Withington	5
NEWCASTLE-ON-TYNE	The county borough	4
NOTTINGHAM	The county borough	4
PLYMOUTH	The county borough	3
PORTSMOUTH	The county borough	3
THE POTTERIES	The county borough of Stoke-on-Trent and the parliamentary division of Newcastle-under-Lyme	4
SALFORD	The county borough	3
SHEFFIELD	The county borough	7
SOUTHAMPTON	The county borough	2
SOUTH STAFFORD	The parliamentary divisions of Dudley, Smethwick, Walsall, Wednesbury, and West Bromwich	4
BOROUGH		
WEST HAM	The county borough	4
WOLVERHAMPTON	The parliamentary divisions of Wolverhampton (3)	3
YORK	The county borough	1

3. WALES, including Monmouthshire—Borough Constituencies

CARDIFF	The parliamentary divisions of Cardiff (3)	3
MERTHYR BOROUGH	The parliamentary divisions of Merthyr Tydfil (2), and Rhondda (2)	4
NEWPORT	The county borough	1

The Case for Electoral Reform

4. SCOTLAND—Borough Constituencies

<i>Name of Constituency</i>	<i>Contents of Constituency</i>	<i>Number of Members</i>
DUMBARTON BURGHS	The burghs of Dumbarton and Clydebank	1
EDINBURGH	The county of the city of Edinburgh and the burgh of Musselburgh	5
GLASGOW:		
East	The parliamentary divisions of Glasgow Central, Springburn, Camlachie, Bridge-ton, and Shettleston	5
West	The parliamentary divisions of Partick, Hillhead, Maryhill, St. Rollox, and Kelvingrove	5
South	The parliamentary divisions of Govan, Tradeston, Gorbals, Pollok, and Cathcart	5
LEITH	The burgh of Leith (<i>see</i> note on p. 123)	1

5. ENGLAND, excluding London and Monmouthshire—Country Constituencies

BEDFORD	The county	3
BERKSHIRE	The county, including the county borough of Reading	4
BUCKINGHAMSHIRE	The county	3
CAMBRIDGE AND HUNTINGDON	The counties of Cambridge, Huntingdon, and the Isle of Ely	4
CHESTER:		
East	The parliamentary divisions of Macclesfield, Stalybridge, Stockport, and Hyde	4
Mid	The parliamentary divisions of Altrincham, Crewe, Knutsford, and Northwich	4
West	The parliamentary divisions of Chester, Edisbury, and Wirral	3
CORNWALL	The county	5
CUMBERLAND	The county, including the county borough of Carlisle	5
DERBY:		
North	The parliamentary divisions of Chesterfield, Clay Cross, High Peak, Derby: North-Eastern, and Derby: Western	5
South	The parliamentary divisions of Belper, Derby City, Ilkeston, and Derby: Southern	5

Appendix I

5. ENGLAND, excluding London and Monmouthshire—Country Constituencies (*continued*)

<i>Name of Constituency</i>	<i>Contents of Constituency</i>	<i>Number of Members</i>
DEVON :		
North	The parliamentary divisions of Barnstaple, Exeter, Honiton, South Molton, and Tiverton	5
South	The parliamentary divisions of Tavistock, Torquay, and Totnes	3
DORSET	The county	4
DURHAM :		
Mid	The parliamentary divisions of Barnard Castle, Bishop Auckland, Durham, Seaham, and Spennymoor	5
North-East	The parliamentary divisions of Houghton-le-Spring, Jarrow, South Shields, and Sunderland	5
North-West	The parliamentary divisions of Blaydon, Chester-le-Street, Consett, and Gateshead	4
South-East	The parliamentary divisions of Darlington, Hartlepool, Sedgefield, and Stockton-on-Tees	4
ESSEX :		
North	The parliamentary divisions of Colchester, Harwich, Maldon, and Saffron Walden	4
South	The parliamentary divisions of East Ham (2), Ilford, and Romford	4
South-East	The parliamentary divisions of Chelmsford, Essex : South-Eastern, and Southend-on-Sea	3
West	The parliamentary divisions of Epping, Leyton (2), and Walthamstow (2)	5
GLOUCESTER :		
East	The parliamentary divisions of Cirencester and Tewkesbury, Cheltenham, and Stroud	3
West	The parliamentary divisions of Forest of Dean, Gloucester, and Thornbury	3
HANTS :		
East	The parliamentary divisions of Aldershot, Fareham, and Petersfield	3
West	The parliamentary divisions of Basingstoke, Bournemouth, New Forest, and Winchester	4

The Case for Electoral Reform ^u

5. ENGLAND, excluding London and Monmouthshire—Country Constituencies (*continued*)

<i>Name of Constituency</i>	<i>Contents of Constituency</i>	<i>Number of Members</i>
HEREFORD :		
Hereford	The parliamentary division of Hereford	1
Leominster	The parliamentary division of Leominster	1
HERTFORD	The county	5
ISLE OF WIGHT	The county	1
KENT :		
East	The parliamentary divisions of Dover, Hythe, and Isle of Thanet	3
North	The parliamentary divisions of Gravesend, and Rochester (2)	2
North-West	The parliamentary divisions of Bromley, Chislehurst, and Dartford	3
South	The parliamentary divisions of Maidstone, Tonbridge, and Sevenoaks	3
Mid	The parliamentary divisions of Ashford, Canterbury, and Faversham	3
LANCASTER :		
East	The parliamentary divisions of Bury, Hey- wood and Radcliffe, Middleton and Prestwich, Rochdale, and Royton	5
North	The parliamentary divisions of Barrow, Lancaster, and Lonsdale	3
North-Central	The parliamentary divisions of Accrington, Blackburn, Darwen, and Rossendale	5
North-East	The parliamentary divisions of Burnley, Clitheroe, and Nelson and Colne	3
North-West	The parliamentary divisions of Blackpool, Chorley, Fylde, and Preston	5
South	The parliamentary divisions of Eccles, Farnworth, and Stretford	3
South-Central	The parliamentary divisions of Bolton, Leigh, Westhoughton, and Wigan	5
South-East	The parliamentary divisions of Ashton- under-Lyne, Mossley, and Oldham	4
South-West	The parliamentary divisions of Ince, New- ton, St. Helens, Warrington, and Widnes	5
West	The parliamentary divisions of Bootle, Ormskirk, Southport, and Waterloo	4
LEICESTER	The county	4

Appendix I

5. ENGLAND, excluding London and Monmouthshire—Country Constituencies (*continued*)

<i>Name of Constituency</i>	<i>Contents of Constituency</i>	<i>Number of Members</i>
LINCOLN AND RUTLAND :		
North-East	The parliamentary divisions of Grimsby, Horncastle, and Louth	3
North-West	The parliamentary divisions of Brigg, Gainsborough, and Lincoln	3
South	The parliamentary divisions of Grantham, Holland-with-Boston, and Rutland and Stamford	3
MIDDLESEX :		
East	The parliamentary divisions of Edmonton, Enfield, and Tottenham (2)	4
North	The parliamentary divisions of Finchley, Hornsey, and Wood Green	3
North-West	The parliamentary divisions of Harrow, Hendon, and Willesden (2)	4
South-West	The parliamentary divisions of Acton, Brentford, and Ealing	3
West	The parliamentary divisions of Spelthorne, Twickenham, and Uxbridge	3
NORFOLK :		
East	The parliamentary divisions of Norfolk: Eastern, Great Yarmouth, Norwich, and Norfolk: Southern	5
West	The parliamentary divisions of King's Lynn, Norfolk: Northern, and Norfolk: South-Western	3
NORTHAMPTON	The counties of Northampton and the Soke of Peterborough, including the county borough of Northampton	5
NORTHUMBERLAND :		
Berwick-on-Tweed	The parliamentary division of Berwick-on-Tweed	1
South-East	The parliamentary divisions of Morpeth, Tynemouth, Wallsend, and Wansbeck	4
Hexham	The parliamentary division of Hexham	1
NOTTINGHAM	The county	5
OXFORD	The county, including the county borough of Oxford	3
SALOP	The county	4

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5. ENGLAND, excluding London and Monmouthshire—Country Constituencies (*continued*)

<i>Name of Constituency</i>	<i>Contents of Constituency</i>	<i>Number of Members</i>
SOMERSET :		
North-East	The parliamentary divisions of Bath, Frome, Wells, and Weston-super-Mare	4
South-West	The parliamentary divisions of Bridgwater, Taunton, and Yeovil	3
STAFFORD :		
North	The parliamentary divisions of Burton, Leek, Stafford, and Stone	4
South	The parliamentary divisions of Cannock, Kingswinford, and Lichfield	3
EAST SUFFOLK		
	The county, including the county borough of Ipswich	4
WEST SUFFOLK :		
Bury St. Edmunds	The parliamentary division of Bury St. Edmunds	1
Sudbury	The parliamentary division of Sudbury	1
SURREY :		
North	The parliamentary divisions of Kingston-on-Thames, Richmond, and Wimbledon	3
North-East	The parliamentary divisions of Croydon (2), and Mitcham	3
South-East	The parliamentary divisions of Surrey: Eastern, Epsom, and Reigate	3
West	The parliamentary divisions of Chertsey, Farnham, and Guildford	3
EAST SUSSEX :		
East	The parliamentary divisions of Eastbourne, Hastings, and Rye	3
Mid	The parliamentary divisions of Brighton, East Grinstead, and Lewes	4
WEST SUSSEX :		
Chichester	The parliamentary division of Chichester	1
Horsham and Worthing	The parliamentary division of Horsham and Worthing	1
WARWICK		
	The county, including the county borough of Coventry	5
WESTMORLAND		
	The county	1
WILTS		
	The county	5
WORCESTER		
	The county, including the county borough of Worcester	5

Appendix I

5. ENGLAND, excluding London and Monmouthshire—Country Constituencies (*continued*)

<i>Name of Constituency</i>	<i>Contents of Constituency</i>	<i>Number of Members</i>
YORK, EAST RIDING	The county of York, East Riding	3
YORK, NORTH RIDING:		
Middlesbrough and Cleveland	The parliamentary divisions of Middlesbrough (2), and Cleveland	3
North Riding	The parliamentary divisions of Richmond, Scarborough and Whitby, and Thirsk and Malton	3
YORK, WEST RIDING:		
Barkston Ash	The parliamentary division of Barkston Ash	1
Barnsley	The parliamentary divisions of Barnsley, Penistone, and Wentworth	3
Doncaster and Rotherham	The parliamentary divisions of Don Valley, Doncaster, Rother Valley, and Rotherham	4
Halifax	The parliamentary divisions of Elland, Halifax, and Sowerby	3
Huddersfield	The parliamentary divisions of Colne Valley, Huddersfield, and Spen Valley	3
Keighley and Shipley	The parliamentary divisions of Keighley, Shipley, and Pudsey and Otley	3
Pontefract	The parliamentary divisions of Hemsworth, Normanton, Pontefract, and Rothwell	4
Ripon	The parliamentary division of Ripon	1
Skipton	The parliamentary division of Skipton	1

6. WALES, including Monmouthshire—Country Constituencies

ANGLESEY AND CARNARVON	The counties of Anglesey and Carnarvon	3
BRECON AND RADNOR	The counties of Brecon and Radnor	1
CARDIGAN	The county	1
CARMARTHEN AND PEMBROKE	The counties of Carmarthen and Pembroke	3
DENBIGH AND FLINT	The counties of Denbigh and Flint	3

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6. WALES, including Monmouthshire—Country Constituencies (continued)

<i>Name of Constituency</i>	<i>Contents of Constituency</i>	<i>Number of Members</i>
GLAMORGAN:		
East	The parliamentary divisions of Caerphilly, Pontypridd, and Llandaff	3
Mid	The parliamentary divisions of Neath, Aberavon, and Ogmore	3
West	The parliamentary divisions of Swansea (2), and Gower	3
MERIONETH	The county	1
MONMOUTH	The county	5
MONTGOMERY	The county	1
		•

7. SCOTLAND—Country Constituencies

ABERDEEN AND KINCARDINE	The counties of Aberdeen and Kincardine, including the county of the city of Aberdeen	5
ARGYLL	The county	1
AYR AND BUTE	The counties of Ayr and Bute	4
BANFF	The county	1
BERWICK AND ROXBURGH	The counties of Berwick and Roxburgh	1
CAITHNESS AND SUTHERLAND	The counties of Caithness and Sutherland	1
DUMBARTON	The county, excluding the burghs of Dumbarton and Clydebank	1
DUMFRIES	The county	1
FIFE	The county	4
FORFAR	The county, including the county of the city of Dundee	4
GALLOWAY	The counties of Kirkcudbright and Wigtown	1
INVERNESS AND ROSS AND CROMARTY:		
Inverness	The parliamentary division of Inverness	1
Ross and Cromarty	The parliamentary division of Ross and Cromarty	1
Western Isles	The parliamentary division of the Western Isles	1

Appendix I

7. SCOTLAND—Country Constituencies (*continued*)

<i>Name of Constituency</i>	<i>Contents of Constituency</i>	<i>Number of Members</i>
LANARK:		
North	The parliamentary divisions of Lanark: Northern, Bothwell, Coatbridge, and Motherwell	4
South	The parliamentary divisions of Rutherglen, Hamilton, and Lanark	3
LOTHIANS		
	The counties of Linlithgow, Midlothian, and Haddington, excluding the burghs of Leith* and Musselburgh	3
MORAY AND NAIRN		
	The counties of Moray and Nairn	1
ORKNEY AND ZETLAND		
	The counties of Orkney and Zetland	1
PEEBLES AND SELKIRK		
	The counties of Peebles and Selkirk	1
PERTH AND KINROSS:		
Perth	The parliamentary division of Perth	1
Kinross and Western	The parliamentary division of Kinross and Western	1
RENFREW		
	The county	4
STIRLING AND CLACKMANNAN		
	The counties of Stirling and Clackmannan	3

8. UNIVERSITIES

ENGLAND AND WALES:

Oxford University	—	2
Cambridge University	—	2
London University	—	1
Wales University	—	1
Combined English Universities	—	2

SCOTLAND:

The Scottish Universities	—	3
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* Leith is now part of the county of the city of Edinburgh.

Appendix II

COUNTRIES USING P.R. ON SEPTEMBER 30, 1937

I. Countries using P.R. for the principal chamber of the legislature; and, in certain cases, in the Second Chamber also.

A. *Empire countries:*

Irish Free State (Eire) Tasmania

B. *Foreign countries:*

Belgium	Holland
Chile	Norway
Czechoslovakia	Sweden
Denmark	Switzerland
Finland	Uruguay

II. Countries using P.R. in some parliamentary elections.

A. *Empire countries:*

Great Britain—Members of the House of Commons representing Universities returning two or more members.

Northern Ireland—(1) Members of the House of Commons of Northern Ireland representing Queen's University; (2) The Senate.

Burma—One-half of the members of the Senate.

Canada, Alberta—Members of the Provincial Legislature representing the cities of Calgary and Edmonton.

Canada, Manitoba—Members of the Provincial Legislature representing the city of Winnipeg.

India—(1) Members of the Federal Assembly elected by the Provincial Legislatures; (2) Part of the Legislative Council of the Provinces of Bengal and Bihar.

Appendix II

South Africa—The Senate (except a few nominated members).

B. *Foreign countries:*

Iceland—Part of the House of Parliament.

III. Countries using P.R. for local elections or for other elections as specified.

A. *Empire countries:*

England—National Assembly of the Church of England: the House of Laity and the House of Clergy (except *ex officio* members).

Irish Free State—All local authorities.

Canada, Alberta—City council of Calgary.

Canada, Manitoba—City council of Winnipeg.

Canada, Saskatchewan—City council of Saskatchewan.

India—Finance committees of the National and the Provincial Legislatures.

South Africa—Executive committee of the Provincial Council of each of the four provinces.

South-West Africa—Executive committee of the Legislative Assembly.

B. *Foreign countries:*

Belgium	Holland
Czechoslovakia	Norway
Denmark	Sweden
Finland	Switzerland

United States—City councils in a number of cities, including New York and Cincinnati.

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